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Abstract: 
This dissertation is an elucidation of the nature of the self. It consists of two major parts.  
The first part is an investigation of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the self, 
appealing to four theses: the Conceivability Thesis, the Equilibrium Thesis, Panpsychism 
and the Multiple Selves Doctrine and the Locus Thesis.  Proponents of these views are 
examined in detail, including Descartes, Avicenna, Strawson, Parfit and Dennett. The 
conditions of selfhood are established through an examination of the individual’s 
perception and how they arrange their perceptions. The second part of the dissertation 
discusses the influences of the outside or others’ perception of a self, and how this can 
influence an individual’s own impression of the self. This is considered using as examples 
the psychological disorders of autism and schizophrenia. The primary aim of this 
dissertation is to establish criteria for the presence of the self in the individual and to 
examine some of the ways in which the self can be expressed. Furthermore, this 
dissertation begins to clarify the importance of the contribution the self makes towards a 
person’s successful functioning within his/her selected community. 
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 What is the I that I am?  
An Enquiry into the Self: Thoughts Based on the Individual and the Perceptions of 
the Other  
“We have all a better guide in ourselves, if we would attend to it, than any other person 
can be.” Jane Austen 
“You need chaos in your soul to give birth to a dancing star.” 
Friedrich Nietzche 
“The soul can never be corrupted with the corruption of the body, but it is like the wind 
which causes the sound of the organ, and which ceases to produce a good effect when a 
pipe is spoilt.” 
Leonardo Da Vinci, Thoughts on Art and Life 
 
This dissertation examines the self; that aspect of an individual which is 
specifically and irrevocably him/her. It is an attempt to remove all extraneous detail and 
identify what it is that makes an individual distinctly him/her. The intention is to define 
what this essence of the individual is, so that, with understanding, an examination of 
human nature can occur. This examination has the central goal of establishing what a self 
is and how can it be identified in an individual. An understanding of the nature of a self 
and its different expressions allows for an examination of unusual cases of persons with a 
deeper understanding of those faculties which contribute towards an individual’s apparent 
distinctiveness. 
An understanding of the nature of the self proves necessary for philosophical 
theories of cognition, personhood and ethical rights. This dissertation tackles the central 
issue of what a self is and the requirements for such a classification. It then examines some 
cases where the ascription of self is called into question. This aspect of the dissertation 
begins to demonstrate how external perceptions of an individual self can be misleading and 
can result in the possible exclusion of individuals from the ethical rights owed to one with 
a self. 
This dissertation follows a relatively simple structure: it is divided into two parts: 
the first is an examination of the self within the individual, and the second is an 
examination of the self as perceived by others. In this case, the first part of the dissertation 
examines a series of philosophical approaches to the self which are discovered through 
internal reflections on the idea of self through exercises in thought and an examination of 
the responses an individual offers with respect to the individual’s own perceptions. The 
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views of the self that will be examined include those of Rene Descartes, Avicenna, Galen 
Strawson, Derek Parfit, and Daniel Dennett. As these methods of thought are elucidated, a 
set of consistent features used to define the nature of the self become apparent, thus 
offering the basis for a set of criteria for the self. The second part of this dissertation 
examines how others’ perceptions of an individual’s self can lead to a variety of 
assumptions about an individual. An examination of the nature of the self in individuals 
with psychological disorders highlights how others’ perceptions can be misleading in 
regards to the establishment of awareness that there is a self within the observed individual. 
Others’ perceptions of a self offer a unique perspective of how the self interacts 
with the world; what the function of a self is to an individual in the world; and what sort of 
reasoning currently leads the average mind to an identification of another self. 
This dissertation attempts to establish a foundation of understanding about the self, 
which can then be used to clarify ethical thinking around beings with and without a self. 
One of the primary assumptions of this dissertation is that the being in question is human. 
However, the ultimate goal would be to establish the requirements of self in a cognitive 
form so that any being that has such faculties can be described as having a self.  
Two primary delimitations of this dissertation are: firstly, the potential for studying 
other beings which may have a self (such as elephants, dolphins or chimpanzees). 
Secondly, there is an opportunity for a comprehensive study on ethical implications of an 
absence of self classification for care treatment within a single species such as humans. 
Some of the central questions examined in this dissertation are: 
1. What is the self? 
a. Does a self exist? 
b. If so, what is its nature? 
2. How can the self be identified? And… 
3. What is the function of the self? 
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PART ONE 
Conditions for the Self through the Individual Perspective  
Chapter One 
The Conceivability Thesis 
The Conceivability Thesis is based on the principle that if ‘X’ is conceivable then it 
is possible that ‘X’. This approach is used to establish that the self is conceivable and 
therefore possible; not only possible according to some philosophers, but definitely the 
case. For Descartes, this approach leads to a type of dualism called “substance dualism.” In 
the next chapter a dualism of substance and subsistence, a variant of substance dualism, is 
discussed. While other philosophers using the Conceivability Thesis reach different 
conclusions when considering the nature of the mind, consciousness and self, nevertheless 
the basis is a shared one. 
Descartes’ Approach to the Self  
Descartes is an Interactionist Substance Dualist, meaning he believes that not only 
is the mind/self an independent substance from the body (which is also a substance) but 
that the two substances interact causally. 
The Approach - Dubito 
Descartes’ philosophical goals were to establish a series of beliefs which he could 
then use as foundations to examine the world. These foundations were to be without the 
fallibilities usually found in a life time’s accumulated beliefs. Descartes approaches his 
task of inner ‘spring cleaning’ by first removing all those concepts and beliefs which can 
be held in contention.
1
 By using doubt as a marker he whittles away at the foundations of 
his own belief system until he believes that he has isolated what it is that he can rely on; 
that is, he believes that he has found the foundation which is ‘doubtless’. Descartes’ 
doubtless foundation is that he thinks and, therefore, a thinker must exist.  
Descartes does not specify that the ‘I’, while necessary for the thought, is required 
to be consistent and persistent. In fact, he is willing to concede that while each thought has 
an ‘I’ it is not necessary that the same ‘I’ preside over bundles of thought such as those 
which he perceives as his. However, before entering into a discussion on multiply ‘I’s (an 
                                                          
1
 Cottingham, John, Ed., (1996). Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the 
Objections and Replies. Cambridge University Press 
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idea which will be discussed later in reference to Galen Strawson)
2
 it is necessary to take a 
closer look at Descartes’ method of reassessment. 
Descartes begins by identifying a foundation and then examining it for doubt. If there is 
doubt then the idea is considered insupportable.
3
 Initially, this seems like an impossible 
task as each adult has accumulated innumerable beliefs and ideas. However, each idea is 
based on a few fundamental assumptions. One of the most important is that our sensory 
perceptions provide the data on which all other assumptions are based. Thus, if it can be 
shown that the sensory data is doubtful then, by default, those beliefs reliant on that data 
are doubtful and can be discarded. This method of elimination is reductive in nature. In this 
case a reductionist removes all things that are not the self; that is, those things which are 
doubtful and considers that the self will be found in what is left.  
Descartes begins from a Dualistic position
4
, that is, he believes in a body and a soul. 
He begins his process of reduction using this logic: all ideas and beliefs are presented to us 
through our senses. Our senses are not reliable as demonstrated by dreams and 
hallucinations. Therefore what is brought to us through our senses contains doubt and must 
be held provisionally as erroneous. From this position the argument can go in two possible 
ways: firstly, that the content of the sensory data is incorrect or, secondly, that the 
processing of the sense data is faulty. A secondary but significant question arises: just what 
aspect of Descartes is considering the relative value of the sensory data? The apparent 
answer is his thought, but would his thought not be the sensory data itself? If this is the 
case two possible scenarios present themselves: that within the faculty of thought there are 
multiple levels; or, that there are two faculties at work in this type of reasoning - the 
faculty of thought and then the faculty that is aware of the thought and is assessing it. Later 
in this chapter there will be a discussion as to whether Descartes’ self is just thought or 
more than thought. For now, let us focus on the reliability of the sensory data.  
Descartes’ distrust of the sensory data is well placed because information gained 
from sensory input is frequently confused. It is hard to identify just where the assessed data 
begins and the unanalysed sensory data ends. The following scenarios are chosen as 
examples not because this distinction can be made easily but because they clearly 
demonstrate the involvement of either a processing error or that the data itself is inaccurate. 
The first scenario is that of a hallucination commonly perceived to be visual and auditory. 
This is a misconception as hallucinations can also occur from any of the other sensors: 
                                                          
2
Strawson, G., (2005). The Self?. Blackwell Publishing, Chapter 4, pp 63-86 
3
 Cottingham, John, Ed.. (1996). Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the 
Objections and Replies. Cambridge University Press 
4
Blackburn, S., (2005) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford University Press, p.105 
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taste, smell and touch.
5
 During a hallucination the person experiencing it perceives the 
hallucination just as if it were a regular perception even if the content may not follow the 
normal rules of physics. Despite this and the fact that the brain analyses the input in the 
same way it would for normal input it is clear that the hallucination’s input is incorrect. 
The sensory data of the hallucination is completely elicited from the brain within the 
person experiencing the hallucination. The possibility of hallucinations demonstrates that 
mistakes can be made.  
Consider the effect of Boundary Extension. Boundary Extension is an effect where 
the perception faculties of the brain interpret the sensory data and rather than examining 
precisely what is present, rearranges the sensory data to make sense of it, and that 
rearrangement is what the mind believes it sees.
6
 For instance, when a person sees a car 
behind a picket fence they do not query whether the object behind the fence is a car 
because they cannot see the full outline of the vehicle; rather, the mind fills in the gaps so 
it appears that the person sees both a car and a picket fence. Studies such as Woodman et al. 
(2003), on visual masking demonstrate how visual input does not always equate to an 
individual’s perception. Object-substitution masking illustrates how an individual can 
experience visual input but not perceive all of the visual input. That is the individual only 
reports the perception of part of the information presented during the experiment but their 
neural responses indicate that the individual identified the other visual stimuli.
7
 These 
cases show clearly why sensory input and its perception contain doubt and therefore the 
beliefs based on it, lack integrity and must be discarded.  
Once what has been of doubt is removed Descartes’ intention is to identify what 
remains. Descartes does not consider the possibility that nothing may remain; rather, he 
concludes that thought remains. Most processes modelled in human thought or by the 
world that we ‘know’ assume a framework that begins with a starting point. For Descartes 
the combination of his dualist position together with his human desire for a reason or 
starting point results in his decision to choose thought as a consistent and definite point. 
Descartes concludes that the thinking, considering thing is the self. This, however, can be 
questioned. The closest Descartes comes to considering an alternative to the self is when 
he posits a hypothetical deceiving daemon.
8
 Descartes offers the basic notion that for every 
                                                          
5Barlow, D. H.; Durand, V. M., (2009). Abnormal Psychology: An Integrative Approach – Firth Edition. 
Wadsworth Cengage Learning, pp 408-409 
6Hubbard, T. L.; Hutchison, J. L.; Courtney, J. R., (2010). Boundary Extension: Findings and Theories, The 
Experimental Psychology Society. pp 1-28 
7
 Woodman, G. F.; Luck, S. J. (2003). Dissociations among Attention, Perception, and Awareness during 
Object Substitution Masking. Psychological Sciences, Vol. 14, No. 6. American Psychological Society 
8Cottingham, John, Ed., (1996). Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the 
Objections and Replies. Cambridge University Press 
8 
 
perception there is a perceiver. The basic predicate of the evil daemon hypothetical is that, 
in some way, the cognitive faculties of an individual are flawed so that what may appear 
within our perceptions as clear and distinct and, therefore, eliciting a sense of assent and 
affirmation should, in fact, be held in doubt. For this epistemic pessimism to be the case, it 
requires a deceiver and a deceived according to Descartes. Descartes claims that the 
deceived is the self, while the evil daemon is the deceiver. These conclusions follow a 
reductionist form.  One of the problems with this type of argument is deciding when the 
simplest form has been identified. It is possible to make a case that the daemon is 
imagining a world just like ours together with the types of thoughts which would belong to 
the individuals in such a world. In this case Descartes’ scenario could be an accurate 
account but rather than the daemon and the self being the existing perceivers only the 
daemon is the perceiver; that is, the daemon is the only thinking being. 
The Cogito 
Descartes makes the statement Cogito Ergo Sum– I think, therefore I am. The 
statement is simple in structure, but this belies a complex meaning.  The first consideration 
is to question whether the ‘I’ referred to is more than or equivalent to the thought. 
Descartes reasons that if there is thought there is a thinker whatever the thinker may be. 
Discussion of the thinker whom Descartes calls ‘the self’ gives the impression of a more 
substantial thing than just thought. Descartes describes several different types of thought 
from wills to desires, imagination, sensory perceptions and doubt. What is clear is that 
once each of these thoughts is elucidated as was done with sensory perception, doubt can 
be found within each. However, Descartes makes a distinction between the content of the 
thought and the action of the thought; the former being doubtful, the latter not. Descartes 
feels that thought, as in the action of thought, is certain and beyond doubt. He reaches this 
conclusion by reasoning that if a deceiver had deceived all the thoughts including the 
thought that there was thought, it still requires a thinker.  
Let us now consider Descartes’ self and whether this self is thought alone (as it 
would seem it should be from his writings) or whether it is more than that. Three questions 
will be asked of this self: what is the self; where, as in where can the self be 
located/isolated (thus what is the substance which comprises the self); and, why is thought 
the basis of the self? The what is simple – the self is thought. While the content is 
questionable, its existence is not. The where has a dualistic response, specifically, that 
thought is non-physical. This is known by the fact that all apparent physical features 
require sensory input thus that content and process of accumulation is doubtful. Descartes’ 
self seems to originate from within the body despite the body being in doubt. This suggests 
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that it would be worthwhile using the three question series to assess the mind. However, 
before discussion turns to the mind let us consider the final question of why. Thought is 
Descartes’ starting point because it is certain. However, it is also likely that thought is the 
starting point because it is necessary that something be Descartes or that Descartes be 
something.   
The characteristics which Descartes attributes to the self such as thought and 
emotions are characteristics often attributed to descriptions of the mind. His religious 
background imbues the self with a sense of the soul. For Descartes it would seem that the 
term ‘soul’ used in a religious sense is related to the person but has a fluidity that makes it 
different from the body, while the term ‘mind’ gives the impression that it is linked more 
closely to the body than the soul. Over the course of Descartes’ Meditations his idea of the 
self seems to move from being analogous with the soul to being analogous with the mind. 
He sees the mind as an overlay of the brain; a non-physical overlay such as a cloud 
hovering above the brain. While the mind and the soul are certainly linked for Descartes, it 
is important that the self is not taken to be the same as the soul or mind. 
The Contribution of Descartes’ Self to a discussion of the Self 
Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (1996) highlight the importance of 
thought. The advent of self-aware thought is considered to be related to the beginning of 
consciousness. Society’s successful functioning as well as an individual’s survival relies on 
the ability of people to have thought. Descartes emphasises the value of reasoning and how 
the examination of our internal being can shed light on what it is that makes us who we are. 
This reasoning led him to an examination of the self and an understanding of what the self 
may consist of; specifically the types of thought such as desires, will, judgements, 
imagination and sensory perceptions. Descartes also shows just how tenuous our link is to 
certainty. Although the content of our thoughts can be misleading this does not mean that 
discoveries cannot be made. In later chapters discussion will arise again on the mistake of 
misnaming who the thinking being is. Descartes identifies the thinking being as the self. 
That is, the deceived being is the self. However, he offers no account for a possible 
scenario whereby the thoughts are that of a evil daemon where the daemon is imagining a 
self and the thoughts of the self – this is an issue.  This chapter will be used as a guideline 
for the discussion as it continues in later chapters as well as when considering a critical 
assessment of the self at the end of Part One. The inquiry into Descartes’ self shows us two 
things: firstly, that thought is an integral part of understanding the self and secondly, that 
this process may require us to consider difficult ideas which may lead us in unexpected 
directions.  
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D.M. Armstrong and the Self – Analysis for Physicalism 
D.M. Armstrong presents an account of the mind-body problem in which rather 
than presenting a non-physical and physical combination as an explanation, he relies on a 
description which sits comfortably beside scientific theories about the physical. This 
approach is called Central State Materialism. Armstrong disagrees with the commonsense 
approach of assuming that because behaviours which give the impression of the self are 
distinct and sophisticated they are special and thus will have a special cause; a cause 
different from that of other simpler behaviours.
9
 
Armstrong considers the scientific approach to be the most valuable method by 
which information can be validated and disputes settled.  Through the process of empirical 
evaluation consensus of thought can be established due to the collection of evidence. 
However, when using consensus as an indicator there are two considerations that must be 
factored in: the first is that intellectual consensus does not remove the fallible nature of the 
ideas. Rather, it acts as a good authority. The second is that the collection of consensus is 
not necessarily indicative of truth.  
Armstrong, like Descartes, uses the Conceivability Thesis to create a base by which 
he examines the nature of the mind. His conception of the mind is the same as the self. One 
could extrapolate that the ‘Self’ would be the name given to the mind by people who abide 
by Descartes’ intuitive approach to the mind-body problem. Armstrong, who does not want 
to use intuition to decipher knowledge, uses the term ‘Mind’.  He calls for theorists to 
conceive the possibility that a mind is possible in a world which is wholly physico-
chemical in nature. He disregards other approaches on the grounds that the attacks on such 
theories indicate that the conceivability of such a resolution of the mind-body problem is 
without full conceptualisation and therefore cannot make the move to possibility. 
Armstrong’s Synthesis Expanded  
The evolution of the mind-body problem by which thought is a pivotal key is as 
follows. 
Process: The Thesis: the mind is an inner arena (Descartes’ Dualism) –> The Antithesis: 
the mind is outward behaviour (Ryle’s Behaviourism10) –> The Synthesis: the mind is the 
inner principle defined by outward behaviours (Armstrong’s Central State Materialism).11 
                                                          
9
Armstrong, D. M., (1981). Minds, Bodies, and Persons. The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Cornell 
University Press, pp 295-302 
10 Ryle, G., (1949). The Concept of Mind. Barnes & Noble Inc, New York 
11Ibid 
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Accordingly, the mind, when thought about carefully, can be understood to be an inner 
principle to which we are led through an examination of outward behaviours. Note that 
careful thought can lead to other conclusions such as those made by Descartes.  Mental 
states, according to Armstrong, are the internal expression of our perceptions which are 
physical states; that is, they are physical states of the central nervous system. Given the 
position that dispositions are states of objects, the mind is then an inner cause of a range of 
behaviours, thus a necessary part of the physical causes which make up an action. For 
Armstrong, it is important that dispositions are actual states thus they can have actual 
power to influence physical behaviours.
12
 
With dispositions as actual states (although it is not yet known what are the 
intrinsic nature of these states), Armstrong feels it is clear that dispositions are actual 
causes, thus causal factors – factors which, given the correct conditions, bring about the 
manifestation of the disposition itself or the behaviour. Therefore the mind or self is a 
cause, an inner principle by which actions are produced and behaviour is expressed. This 
conclusion is relevantly similar to that held by Dennett
13
 discussed in Chapter Four. Within 
this approach consciousness is simply the perception of our own state of mind.
14
 
Armstrong’s approach fits in with Searle’s position that mental phenomena make up lower 
neural processes and that consciousness is part of high cognitive processes.
15
 For 
Armstrong, consciousness, the result of dispositional states, is the behaviour of a scanning 
mechanism of the central nervous system’s other expressions or behaviours. The self or 
mind is the inner cause of that range of behaviours. 
E.J. Lowe’s Non Cartesian Substance Dualism 
E. J. Lowe presents a thesis in accordance with Descartes’ view as far as both the 
person or self and the organic body are substances.
16
 Where he deviates from Descartes’ 
thesis is in the interaction between the self and the body not being one of free interaction, 
nor is it one where the two substances are capable of independent existence. For Lowe, the 
person or self and the physical body are distinct substances. A substance being something 
which maintains its existence across time and which bears distinct properties. The Lowean 
                                                          
12Ibid 
13Dennett, D. C., (2005). Sweet Dreams, Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. The MIT 
Press, Cambridge 
14Armstrong, D. M., (1981). Minds, Bodies, and Persons: The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Cornell 
University Press, pp 295-302 
15Searle, J. R.. Why I Am Not A Property Dualist. 
http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~paller/dialogue/propertydualism.pdf, pp 1-6, accessed 10th June 
2013 
16Lowe, E. J., (2006) Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation’, Erkenntnis, 
Springer, DOI: 10.1007/s 10670-006-9012-3, pp. 5-23 
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self cannot exist independently of the body; rather, it is part of its body. The body is the 
physical aspect by which the self can be described but none the less it is a distinct 
substance in its own right.
17
 This is an important distinction between Lowe and Descartes 
because the type of relationship suggested by Lowe eliminates the Cartesian tendency to 
lead the thinker to fallible beliefs on the nature of the interaction between the self and the 
physical.  
Physicalism cannot explain the unique teleological and intentional nature that one 
finds in the self. While this approach tries to adequately account for the distinction of the 
self it must walk a path between Reductionism and Eliminativism.
18
  The Lowean self has 
a physical property, that is, it has its body. Lowe identifies the physical aspect of the self 
and the autonomous nature of mental causation.
19
 It is in this identification that he feels his 
approach is stronger than Descartes’ version of the self or the Physicalist approaches such 
as Armstrong. Lowes’ strength is in the position that the self is not a purely mental 
substance. 
John R. Searle – The Soul and the Flesh 
Searle’s position is that of biological naturalism: the thesis that mental phenomena 
are caused by lower neural processes and that these processes are, in turn, realised in the 
brain’s higher level functions such as those of consciousness and intuition. This is 
frequently mistaken for property dualism. Theories on the mind-body problem according to 
Searle often make the mistake that the self and body are distinct due to language which 
alludes to a difference (a problem discussed in Chapter Four in connection with 
Anscombe’s views) and conceptual confusion coupled with intellectual ignorance of the 
brain. 
There are two central theses in Searle’s philosophy: that the material world is 
public and the conscious world is private. The material or physical world can be known 
objectively and measured, while the internal world of our consciousness is private and 
subjective. It is using the measure of personal subjective conviction that we know of the 
self. Through the objective and the subjective, consciousness and matter are known to be 
                                                          
17Robinson, H., (Winter 2012 Edition). Dualism. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Edward N. 
Zalta(ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/dualism/, accessed the 11 June 2013 
18Lowe, E. J., (October 1993). Mind. The Causal Autonomy of the Mental. Vol. 102, 408, Oxford University 
Press 
19Robinson, H., (Winter 2012 Edition). Dualism. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Edward N. 
Zalta(ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/dualism/, accessed on  the 11 June 
2013 
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different and distinct phenomena, because they are not reducible to any lesser form.
20
  
Searle presents this reasoning with respect to the relative reducibility of consciousness and 
matter. First, if consciousness can be reduced into physical descriptions then it would be 
Materialism. Likewise, if the physical world could be reduced to a description of 
consciousness then Idealism would be realised. Searle states that Materialism and Idealism 
are false. Therefore Dualism must be true.
21
 
Searle considers the problem of Dualism (how the self and the body interact) 
through a consideration of causality. In doing so two types of causal explanations are 
identified. An explanation of a raised hand could come in the form of a neural and 
muscular description or in the form of desires and beliefs. The result of having more than 
one legitimate cause for any given action is causal over-determination.
22
  It is ill-advised to 
consider using one’s subjective perception and the objective state of the external world that 
only two foundational categories of metaphysics exist: that of consciousness and matter. A 
conclusion drawn from the case of the raised hand is that any individual can choose to 
describe an action by any number of interpretations, therefore, to conclude that there are 
only two is an injudicious step.
23
 This illustrates the influence of the Conceivability Thesis 
in Searle’s thinking; that is, this conclusion arises from the acknowledgement that any 
number of interpretations are conceivable thus any number are possible. Searle suggests a 
reconsideration of what it is to be reducible. He suggests that consciousness could be 
reduced causally to the imprint it leaves on the physical brain; that the mental phenomena 
which constitute consciousness can only be measured by their imprint – the causal 
activation of lower neural processes. Thus the definition of the mental phenomena should 
be described by their action, for what is an object if not its effect on the world, its 
persistence across time and it properties as seen by its action and interaction with its 
environment? 
The Conceivability Thesis Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to begin to indicate some of the range of possible 
approaches to the question of the self and its position within the world. The Conceivability 
Thesis describes a principle by which conceivability results in possibility. This type of 
thesis can tend towards the flaw of in absurdum. To ensure against this the facts must be 
                                                          
20
Searle, J. R. Why I Am Not A Property Dualist. 
http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~paller/dialogue/propertydualism.pdf, pp 1-6, accessed on the 10 
June 2013 
21Ibid 
22Ibid 
23Ibid 
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strictly adhered to and steps forward taken only in the presence of conviction, for as 
Armstrong explains, conviction is a good authority despite it fallibility.   
  
15 
 
Chapter Two 
The Equilibrium Thesis 
The Equilibrium Thesis offers a yin and yang approach to the self. According to 
this view, the self is the product of the unique intermingling of phenomenological and 
abstract impressions. Phenomenological impressions occur through our interaction with the 
world and the world with us. These impressions come to us through our physical senses 
while abstract impressions arise from the internal workings of our brains. It is the very 
particular relationship between the two which gives rise to the self. The self is the ultimate 
expression of the merging between the external world and the internal world of humans. 
We are led to this view by the examination of the causes behind behaviour. Avicenna, the 
central figure in this approach, explains that behaviours can be accounted for through 
either phenomenological or abstract faculties. Abstract faculties belong to the internal part 
of the person while the phenomenological belongs to the external. Avicenna argues that a 
balance between the internal and external influences of the person combine to make the 
contributions of the self or soul. Other major contributing proponents of this Equilibrium 
view include David Hume and Thomas Aquinas. 
The Debate Begins with a Dalliance with Dualism 
The Floating Man Thought Experiment illustrates the parallels between the views of 
Descartes and Avicenna. Avicenna posits this hypothetical: 
1. A perfect man is suspended in space. 
2. This man is unable to use any of his sensory faculties. 
 
Philosophers have drawn distinct conclusions from this hypothetical. Some have concluded 
that (i) the floating man experiences nothing.  Others have concluded to the contrary that 
(ii) the floating man experiences something  
The third part of this thought experiment is the nexus from which many arguments arise. 
Only one of these arguments will be examined in this piece but some others will be 
mentioned.  
Physicalists endorse Conclusion (i): that the man experiences nothing without his 
senses. They believe that true sensory deprivation would mean that even internal 
sensations such as a stomach gurgling would not be felt. A Dualist may argue that despite 
the lack of sensory input the floating man will still experience some sort of internal 
dialogue. This approach is based on the belief that a non-physical thing, quite unrelated to 
16 
 
the outside world other than through the body, interacts with the body. Debates have raged 
over the nature of these non-physical objects but for Avicenna the non-physical aspect of 
the body is the soul.
24
 
There are two possible responses to Avicenna’s belief in the body and a soul which 
arise as a result of his support for Conclusion (ii). These responses are what constitute 
Avicenna’s Floating Man Hypothesis. The first response is that the floating man does have 
experiences and that these experiences are evidence for the hypothesis that the soul is 
independent of the body. To clarify – the soul, while residing in the body because of the 
benefits it gains from the sensory faculties, is not part of the body. Rather, a mutually 
beneficial relationship forms between the body and the soul. The body benefits in that the 
soul allows the body to learn and respond in a considered manner to its environment, while 
the soul benefits by being able to become intellectus in habitu.
25
 The second response that 
arises from an affirmative answer is that some type of self-awareness is present within the 
body. For Avicenna, this self-awareness is the soul because it denotes what distinguishes a 
living body from a dead body.  Incidentally, this means that according to Avicenna’s 
philosophy as long as the floating man is alive, regardless of his environment, he must 
have a soul within.
26
 
Avicenna’s dualistic thesis means that he accepts these responses which result from 
the Floating Man Hypothesis. A new question arises: how do we know that the thinking or 
self-aware being is the self? The soul or self in Avicenna’s philosophy is independent of 
the body within which it resides. However, it is possible to imagine at least one scenario 
where the knowing self is not the self to which Avicenna’s theory alludes. Rather than 
Avicenna’s soul being devoted to its individual body, it may in fact be a fragment of a 
greater soul, such as a daemon, who is imagining a set of interactions involving Avicenna. 
This daemon is playing out elaborate characters all of whom perceive themselves to be 
unique and individual when, in fact, they are part of a greater being. Avicenna, like 
Descartes, does not respond to this question of distinguishing precisely what the supposed 
soul is. Descartes suggests that even if a daemon were attempting to deceive him he still 
must exist to be deceived.
27
 An argument such as this is fundamentally a discussion of 
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whether what we perceive through internal examination or external evidence is sufficient 
to make a conclusive statement. In the fourth section of Part One of this dissertation this 
problem will be examined. 
Avicenna and Descartes have several similarities and differences in their theories 
regarding the self. Avicenna  approaches the discussion through the natural sciences with a 
focus on how the soul could explain more fully the condition of humanity. Descartes 
comes from an epistemological perspective. Both philosophers remove the confusing 
information and attempt to isolate the self.  Avicenna seeks to find the simplest explanation 
for what he knows of the physical world. Descartes removes all things that contain doubt 
and settles on what is left. Avicenna searches for a simple clear explanation, while 
Descartes searches for an idea which is reliable and can act as the foundation for his 
philosophy. A further difference between the two philosophers is that for Descartes the 
importance of the self is intimately linked with the question of God while despite 
Avicenna’s education and upbringing his focus is on physiological clarity.  
Avicenna brings at least two important points to the examination of the self. His 
discussion of the relationship between the body and the soul demonstrates the level to 
which the two topics of physiology and the self or soul are linked. For Avicenna, they are 
inextricable despite being independent in theory. Secondly, his theory raises the same 
problem found in Descartes: whether the knowing subject is the self or the soul. Although 
neither philosopher untangles this issue they both make the same  assumption that the 
thinking subject is the self. It is an important issue to keep in mind as this dissertation 
questions this presupposition as it tries to establish an adequate definition of self. 
Avicenna’s Shape of the Soul 
Avicenna’s theories, like Descartes’, follow a reductionist method in isolating the 
presence of the self. For Avicenna the terms ‘self’ and ‘soul’ can be used interchangeably. 
This is possibly due to the quality of translation from the original Arabic to English. For 
instance, the term ‘nafs’ at the time of Avicenna’s writing meant soul, the self or person.28 
A similar term ‘ruh’ meant divine quality. These are religious terms found in both Islamic 
and Christian teachings.
29
 Avicenna is not using the term ‘soul’ for its potentially 
metaphysical meaning; rather he is using it to distinguish between states: a body without 
life compared to one with life.
30
 Although Descartes uses the term ‘self’ as opposed to the 
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term ‘soul’ there are certainly references in his Meditations to ideas commonly associated 
with the soul. While Descartes uses the term ‘soul’, it is only in conjunction with the 
meaning he uses for the term ‘self.’ For him the terms ‘soul’ and ‘self’ are synonyms 
which stress different aspects of the same idea. 
Avicenna’s soul (specifically the human soul) consists of an accumulation of the 
animal and the vegetable soul as well as several other faculties. He is not suggesting that 
the human has three souls; the vegetable, the animal and the human; rather, he is 
suggesting that all living things have a soul and that depending on the complexity of the 
living thing that soul will be relative to its body’s complexity.  (This is an older Platonic 
idea.) Avicenna states  
“the soul is like single genus divisible in some way into three 
parts.”31 
His approach to the soul involves the examination of simpler life forms and what 
are necessary for their existence. It is important to appreciate that the use of the term ‘soul’ 
is not necessarily referencing a conscious being. His expertise in natural science led 
Avicenna to take a physiological approach in understanding the soul, that is, slowly adding 
faculties as they became apparent in his examination of his three levels of soul: vegetable, 
animal and human. Avicenna sees the vegetable soul as a group of faculties which, when 
collected together, epitomise what it is to be a plant. By then adding the faculties of a plant 
to others found in animals, what it is to be an animal. In this way an animal soul is 
identified. Likewise, he takes the faculties of the animal and adds to them further faculties 
found in humans to identify a human soul. The idea of other physical items containing 
souls is similar to Galen Strawson’s Panpsychism which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Avicenna describes two major intellects in his human soul:  the Practical Intellect 
and the Theoretical Intellect. These two intellects can be loosely described as a 
predominately physiological intellect and a predominantly abstract intellect.
32
 
Avicenna’s description of the soul involves the interaction between the 
physiological sense and the abstract abilities of the soul. The soul and body are entwined in 
that the soul affects the body and the body informs the soul. Perception provides the 
evidence for Avicenna’s belief in the existence of the soul. Perception provides his first 
insight into the relationship between the physiological and the abstract which is his basis 
for the soul. Sight was described by many thinkers of his time as a projection of a ray onto 
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the outside world and then the retrieval of this ray with information. Avicenna 
hypothesized that rather than the eye projecting something, the eye absorbs information 
from its surroundings through the faculty of ‘Representation’; specifically that the eye 
receives the form of the object rather than the matter of the object. The faculty of 
‘Imagination’ reconciles the abstract nature of the form with its material counterpart. The 
‘Representative’ faculty distinguishes between the direct physiological implications of the 
form and the more abstract implications. For instance, the form will tell the soul that the 
object is a lion while the abstract implications are that the lion is dangerous and not to be 
patted like its cousin, the domestic cat. It also informs the ‘Appetitive’ faculty of the soul. 
The Appetitive faculty governs the responses of the body to the object. This group of 
faculties is called ‘Anterior’ and when these are combined with the ‘Posterior’ the 
information of the form and the abstractions of it can be conserved and preserved. 
‘Perception’ provides evidence for the soul in that it demonstrates what Avicenna thinks to 
be a clear example of the physical and non-physical interacting. The example of sight 
depicts the interaction between the physiological and abstract. From this Avicenna 
endorses the idea that it is the soul which controls this relationship. To perform as a 
mediator between the physiological and the abstract Avicenna anticipates that the soul 
must be non-physical. 
Aristotle spoke of entelechy, the essence which brings a being into realisation and 
equates to Avicenna’s ‘Divine Spirit’.33 The Divine Spirit or ‘Light’ flows through the 
faculties to initiate the ‘Intellect’ and brings activation into an otherwise physiological 
construct. Avicenna focuses on the physiological when he gives accounts of the soul 
because he believes that the soul is responsible for the activity of the living body.
34
 The 
final act of unification between the abstract interpretations of the theoretical intellect and 
the matter of the practical intellect is made by the Divine Spirit. This final step illustrates 
why the soul can be existent without the body but that the body is necessary for the soul’s 
expression.
35
  Before the soul is linked with the body it is pure quiddity
36
.
37
 The soul needs 
the body because it is through the body that the soul has its expression. A soul with no 
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body has no way to make its presence known. The abstract aspects of the soul have no way 
by which they can be exhibited without a way of affecting the physical world. So the soul 
acts like a bridge between the non-physical and the physical world. Avicenna advocates the 
tabula rasa theory.
38
 Tabula rasa is the idea that an individual is born with no innate ideas; 
they are a blank page.
39
 Within the structure of Avicenna’s soul this occurs through the 
disconnection between the Practical Intellect and the Theoretical Intellect. There are three 
states or ways that the Theoretical Intellect can be elicited. The first is absolute potentiality 
or material intellect; the second, partial potentiality or relative potentiality; and, finally, 
perfect potentiality or intellectus in habitu. These states describe levels of mastery of 
learnable skills, not levels of capacity to have a soul. When the soul interacts with its 
Practical Intellect the Theoretical Intellect progresses from absolute potentiality. Before it 
receives information from the Practical Intellect, which in essence records and interprets 
the forms presented by the environment, the Theoretical Intellect is like a cup containing 
no liquid – an empty shell, an object which cannot fulfil its function, an empty slate (thus 
tabula rasa). 
Thomas Aquinas and the Equilibrium Thesis 
Thomas Aquinas uses the term ‘soul’ rather than ‘self’ to denote the essence of 
what it is to be human. He, like Avicenna, discusses three aspects of the soul and it is the 
third and final aspect which is considered to be the soul in its fullest sense. It is this 
advanced version of the soul which Aquinas considers interchangeable with the self as 
discussed in other parts of this dissertation. Aquinas advocates two theses about the human 
animal.
40
 Firstly, he says that it has substance - a physical presence in the world. Secondly, 
he claims that once its substance has passed it has something which remains, a subsistent. 
For Aquinas the soul or self is subsistent to the human body; when parted from the body, it 
is not whole and therefore cannot be considered to be substance independent of the body. 
The body provides an interface by which the soul can express itself.   
The Intellect for Aquinas, as for Avicenna, is vital to the understanding of the soul 
and the human. When considering human behaviour, Aquinas suggests that the Intellect 
acts knowingly and willingly to examine its sensory impressions. Due to the incomplete 
nature of our sensory impressions, the Intellect acts as a processor of this information. The 
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pattern of this assessment is a series of interacting arguments which lead to the position the 
individual will act on in response to the sensory input. This interchange is that which 
Aquinas considers unique to the human animal and he describes it as ‘Rationality’.41 
Aquinas is in agreement with Avicenna and his emphasis on the Intellect; 
specifically he maintains that the ‘Human Intellect’ is rational. He also supports the 
concept that humans have accumulated all three expressions of the soul, although he names 
them slightly differently: the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul and the rational intellect 
soul. The Vegetative aspect of the soul interacts specifically with the physical body. The 
Sensitive aspect causes action within the physical body by the interpretations of the sense 
impressions. It allows the being to not only exist but to act wilfully within its existence and 
perceive its existence. For Aquinas the highest aspect of the soul is the ‘Rational Intellect’. 
He describes it as the ability to go beyond collection and retention of data to reason. It is 
not reliant on any physical organ; rather it is the engagement of higher order cognitive 
function.
42
 
According to the Equilibrium Thesis it is the intermingling of the 
phenomenological impressions with the higher order abstract impressions which leads to 
the expression of the soul. Aquinas’ lower aspects of the soul, the Sensitive and the 
Vegetative, deal directly with responding to the physical needs of the beings they are found 
in. The Rational Intellect, on the other hand, deals with what the Equilibrium Thesis calls 
the abstract impressions. It is the combined presence of each of these three aspects which 
contribute to the existence of the self. While it is possible for the soul or self to exist 
without the body it would have no form with which to interact with the world. Therefore, it 
is through its relationship with the physical body that the self has expression.
43
 
A Brief ‘Humean’ Approach to the Equilibrium Thesis 
David Hume’s works describe a self which acts as a reference point for multiple 
impressions and ideas as opposed to just one idea or impression. In his discussions on 
knowledge he elucidates the nature of knowledge and the types of impressions which lead 
to ideas. For him impressions come in two forms: sensations and reflections.
44
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Sensations are those experiences which come to us through our senses. Sensory 
information is akin to Avicenna’s and Aquinas’ external sensations or phenomenological 
impressions. It is the data which is received from the world around us. Reflections are the 
product of our minds or brains; they are the consideration of our internal world. Together, 
reflections and sensations constitute the impressions which, in turn, are the source of our 
ideas.
45
 
Our ideas and perceptions lead us to the self. According to Hume, our perceptions 
are not infinitely divisible. The parts or perceptions are all there is. There is no greater 
whole. It cannot be broken down into smaller and smaller parts. Rather, there is a finite 
expression of each perception.
46
 Hume explains that, like a chain, perceptions cannot be 
broken down in order to isolate the self. This being the case, he extends his explanation to 
say that the self is its parts or perceptions. He claims that we cannot directly experience 
ourselves; rather we can only experience that which we are experiencing in any given 
moment.
47
 
The Bipartite Conclusion 
The essence of the Equilibrium approach is that it is the relationship between the 
impressions of the external world and the internal world which gives rise to what is known 
as the self. The self epitomises the interchange between the impressions resulting from the 
perceptions of our sensory input and our internal reflections. Phenomenological or sensory 
impressions together with abstract reflections provide the parts of the puzzle which 
expresses the self. The self cannot be found within individual parts nor in what remains 
once the parts are taken away. Rather, the self is its parts.  
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Chapter Three 
Panpsychism and the Multiple Selves Doctrine 
Panpsychism 
Panpsychists hold the position that if it is possible for a body to have a mental life 
then it is possible that other types of matter may also have a mental life and, if that is the 
case, then perhaps not just some matter but possibly all matter have mental lives. While 
Panpsychism is not a formal theory of the mind it still has distinct parameters. Thomas 
Nagel proposes that it has four premises: that dualism, reductionism, elminativism, and 
emergence are not true.
48
 Dualism has a variety of expressions, some of which have been 
discussed in Chapter One. Reductionism is the theory that all things can be reduced to a 
simple form. In the case of theories of mind, reductionism holds that all features of the 
mind or self, such as consciousness, can be reduced to physical phenomena. Eliminativism, 
with respect to mind theory, holds that the psychological descriptions of the self, such as 
narrativity theories
49
 will be replaced as more is understood of the physical world. 
Emergence is the theory that the self is the product of social immersion: it is social 
interactions that result in the product or appearance of the self. None of these four theories 
provides a description of how the self may be expressed within the world. Panpsychism 
offers an account whereby things in the world are best described by a complex system 
which allows for both physical descriptions of the person as well as mental aspects – the 
self.
50
 The mind or the self is a form of universal concept. Panpsychism also holds that not 
only do complex systems comprise a combination of both mental and physical attributes 
but that the mental aspect has a unifying capacity which provides a singular coherence or 
illusion.
51
 
Galen Strawson’s Approach to the Self – its Assumptions and Perspectives 
Strawson is a panpsychist who endorses a view of the self whereby multiple 
descriptions or types of selves are possible and each type has the potential to evolve and 
deepen. Throughout many of his articles on the Narrativity Thesis Strawson gives an 
impassioned rejection of the idea that the psychological Narrativity Thesis is the only 
description of the self and the only path to living the ‘good life’. Strawson’s work relies on 
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a group of assumptions the acknowledgement of which allows for a smooth transition into 
his more detailed position on the self. Due to his beliefs concerning the self being in 
tension with those beliefs held by the wider community, he spends more time describing 
his theory than examining it in a wider context. The first of his assumptions is that there is 
a self. This assumption is based on his endorsement of panpsychism which is the claim that 
physical reality consists of an object’s apparent physical properties together with its 
instantiated phenomenal properties.
52
 What this means is that in order for a nonphysical 
feature such as consciousness to exist it must be a property of an object or substance. In the 
case of the self it is consciousness which is the property that Strawson attributes to all 
physical or natural things. Panpsychism states that there is something that it is like to be 
any physical object or substance. The unity of such objects as those that comprise a human 
being result in consciousness which in turn is the expression of the self. Panpsychism can 
lead to hylozoism: the belief that all matter has life;
53
 although Strawson does not appear to 
pursue this. 
The second assumption or judgement on which Strawson’s theories rely is the 
distinction between two views.
54
 The first view is that discussion of the human being as a 
whole is different from discussion of a view where the individual is the self. This 
distinction is clearer when considered in conjunction with the panpsychist perspective. The 
human being as a whole includes both physical properties and consciousness; while the 
self is the consciousness alone. It is the ultimate expression of the person rather than the 
being. These distinctions become important during the discussion of diachronic versus 
episodic people and narrative versus non-narrative people later in this chapter. 
The Temporal Temperament
55
 
The Psychological Narrativity Thesis
56
 establishes a narrative view of the self. The 
self is our individual narrative which is constructed by our autobiographical memories. 
According to this view, the self is the chief character in the autobiographical narrative. A 
person perceives who they are as a continuous stream; each event intimately and 
necessarily linked with other events although not necessarily in the chronological sequence 
of their advent. The Psychological Narrative Thesis is frequently accompanied by the an 
ethical theses whereby not only is the Psychological Narrative Thesis how people 
                                                          
52
 Goff, P., (2009). Why Panpsychism doesn’t Help Us Explain Consciousness. Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 
Oxford, pp 1-23 
53
Blackburn, S. (2005) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford University Press,  p 174 
54
Strawson, G., (2010). Narrativity and non-Narrativity. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., pp 775-780 
55
Ibid 
56
 Strawson, G., (2005). The Self?. Blackwell Publishing, Chapter 4.  Against Narrativity. pp 63-86 
25 
 
experience the world but it is the right or proper way to experience the world.
57
 Strawson’s 
alternative proposal widens the description of the self.  He breaks down what it is to be 
narrative and explains that there are two processes at work. The first is that a ‘narrative 
person’ is diachronic, that is, his/her sense of self persists across time. The adult self is the 
same self as in the five year old girl, and will be the same self in the older woman to come. 
Each experience only adds and expands the understanding and knowledge that that person 
has of his/her self.  The second aspect of narrative persons is that they are narrative in their 
diachronicity; the way they describe their persistent self is through narrative. It is not 
necessary that a person who is diachronic in nature must be narrative. However, this is 
often the case, according to Strawson.  
After considering the Psychological Narrativity Thesis, Strawson expands his own 
concept of the self to include two spectrums of temporal temperament. His theory 
establishes a self that can be defined by the presence or absence of a series of descriptive 
categories. These categories are: non-diachronic/episodic or diachronic; and narrative or 
non-narrative. When defining the categories of ‘Diachronic’ and ‘Episodic’ the definitions 
prescribe the second view, that is, that of a person considering who they are as the ‘self’.  
The diachronic person’s perception of his/her self is persistent through time, while an 
episodic person sees his/her self as in the current moment. The current moment self does 
not consider itself to be the same self as that present in the person’s past or that will be 
present in the person’s future. Rather each self in any given moment is completely 
different while being of the same individual. The episodic person considers the self in 
direct relation to his/her current circumstances. Included in this will be any experience that 
informs that circumstance for him/her. The psychologist Erik H Erikson described a 
person’s development like this:  
“we do not consider all development a series of crises. We claim 
only that psycho-social development proceeds by critical steps. 
‘Critical’ being a characteristic of turning points, of moments of 
decision between progress and regression, integration and 
retardation.”58 
This description holds true for both the episodic and the diachronic person although the 
description is closer to a diachronic view. These features of selfhood can arise in any 
combination enabling the inclusion of many possible types of self. Strawson offers an 
unusual alternative to the current literature which is dominated by the Narrativity Thesis. 
Multiple Selves Doctrine 
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The episodic nature can be described as having multiple selves. This idea results 
from the notion that the self of the immediate present is different from the self of the past 
and will be different from that of the future. Given the number of moments which make up 
a person’s life this leads to the idea that the person as a whole is made up of multiple 
selves. This clearly illustrates the difference between the two views. The idea that a person 
is a collective of selves was voiced briefly in the chapter on the Conceivability Thesis. 
Descartes’ position that thought implies a thinker was not justified by the claim that all 
thoughts share a common thinker. Rather, it could be possible that the ‘he’ to whom 
Descartes refers is the human being taken as a whole while the thinker, in congress with 
the thought, could be a reference to the self. Thus the human being as a whole is comprised 
of bundles of selves or ‘I’s.  Psychology discusses the notion of multiple selves in different 
ways: some as discussed in previous chapters and others found in developmental 
psychology where selves can be discussed as ‘trying on outfits’.59 A diachronic theory, by 
contrast, does not lend itself to the ideas of a multiple self.   
Strawson suggests that a definition or explanation for the self can be garnered by an 
inclusive description. He states that the view of the Psychology Narrative Thesis is limiting 
and exclusive in nature. If the Ethical Narrativity Thesis and the Psychological Narrativity 
Thesis are to be taken as true then a potentially destructive outlook is introduced into the 
therapeutic environment. The passion with which Strawson pursues the broadening of ‘self’ 
definitions to include the episodic is the result of his own experience. He uses his own 
personal account of his internal reflections to illustrate the episodic perspective. 
“I need to say more about the Episodic life, and since I find myself 
to be relatively Episodic, I’ll use myself as an example. I have a 
past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a 
past. I have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, 
and I also remember some of my past experiences ‘from the 
inside’, as philosophers say. And yet I have absolutely no sense of 
my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without 
form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest 
in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future. 
That’s one way to put it – to speak in terms of limited interest. 
Another way is to say that it seems clear to me, when I am 
experiencing or apprehending myself as a self, that the remoter 
past or future in question is not my past or future, although it is 
certainly the past or future of GS the human being. This is more 
dramatic, but I think it is equally correct, when I am figuring 
myself as a self. I have no significant sense that I – the I now 
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considering this question – was there in the further past. And it 
seems clear to me that this is not a failure of feeling. It is, rather, a 
registration of a fact about what I am – about what the thing that is 
currently considering this problem is.”60 
Strawson values and works towards the inclusion of all people when he describes the self 
because he understands the experience of exclusion from what is considered normal. While 
his motivations may be questionable his findings should be valued. 
Strawson’s work highlights several points. First, that theories of the self are often 
integrated with theories on ethics. This is because the self is considered vital to personhood 
and personhood is the key by which society is defined. People with unusual or abnormal 
personhoods are often rejected from the wider community. Therefore, careful consideration 
should be given to the ethical implications of any theory of the self. Secondly, that 
personal reflection alone cannot bring the full truth of the self to light because if it has 
multiple expressions, as Strawson suggests it does, then it is possible that the seeker is only 
one of the possible selves.  The notion that there are multiple descriptions of the self is 
tenable given the variance between people. However, one can expect to find at least some 
unifying characteristics. Although not elaborated on, a third point regarding Strawson’s 
self is that it is non-physical just as Avicenna’s and Descartes’ were before him. The 
Panpsychism position of Strawson introduces consciousness to the discussion. 
Consciousness is what provides sentience, but for some philosophers of self it does not 
necessarily provide personhood or self-consciousness. For Strawson, it is the specific 
combination of consciousness within the human being which results in the self. The final 
point which Strawson provides is the valuable distinction between the two views that one 
can have of one’s self. The first is the consideration that one is the whole human being 
while the second is that the one is the internal mental entity or self.  
Derek Parfit 
Parfit offers a series of thought-experiments which illustrate some of the questions 
which arise regarding self and body unities. The focus of his work is the concept of 
‘person’; in this case, it is fair to use this word as equivalent to the word ‘self’. Parfit offers 
an approach whereby the person or self and the body and brain are not independently 
existing entities.
61
 Recalling substance dualism, Parfit’s view of the self  is that  it and the 
physical body are not two different substances but that the self and its body are the same 
substance.  
                                                          
60Strawson, G., (2005). The Self?. Blackwell Publishing, Chapter 4.  Against Narrativity. pp 63-86 
61
Parfit on What Matters. The Phantom Self: A Case for Conceptual Reform. http://phantomself.org/parfit-
on-what-matters/, accessed on the 18 June 2013 
28 
 
When Parfit considers the self it is in the light of the self over time; what it is to be 
a person who persists through time.  Like Strawson, the self for Parfit is described most 
clearly through the internal contemplation of how it feels to the contemplator and this then 
is cross referenced with others’ accounts of the self. Parfit then supplements this subjective 
information with thought-experiments which present different conundrums whereby he can 
posit possible outcomes which effect his perception of the person. Both Strawson and 
Parfit consider psychological literature in addition to their subjective examinations. 
Strawson discusses a type of self which does not perceive itself in a narrative form. He also 
describes another variant that does not consider itself to be persistent across time, in the 
sense that the same self does not persist. Parfit explains that personhood relies on 
psychological continuity and connectedness.
62
 
Psychological Continuity and Connectedness 
Parfit endorses Strawson’s episodic self in that he agrees that a self is distinct and 
complete in a moment and that any preceding or future moments’ self is not the same as 
that of the current moment; therefore for every person there are multiple selves. Parfit uses 
psychological continuity and connectedness to express the relationship between the selves. 
These two concepts provide the structure by which an individual’s person is collected 
together. It provides the grouping of the self. Later the problem of ‘time slices’ will be 
discussed in more detail but for now it is sufficient to say that when the mind-body 
problem is reduced to its simplest form – multiple selves are realised. Consequently, a 
theory has to be offered to explain why the selves should be considered to be of the same 
person, for if they are completely independent selves inhabiting the same body (if at 
different times) then they cannot be held accountable for the actions of other selves. The 
problem of accountability is often discussed by philosophers looking at ethical issues 
associated with the self. 
Parfit proposes that each individual will have selves which are related by 
psychological continuity and connectedness.  The distinction between psychological 
continuity and psychological connectedness is proximity. Selves are psychologically 
connected when they share most of the same psychological states.  Selves that are 
psychologically continuous share no psychological expression rather they are related 
through those other selves which are connected to them. If at some point across an 
individual’s timeline two selves could be shown to share a common self thus are connected 
in their relationship, then the selves in question can be said to be continuous. A 
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psychological continuity holds if at some point the two selves shared a common link 
however distant.
63
 The individual’s time line stretches behind and in front for every 
individual and it has an infinite number of moments and, therefore, selves past, current and 
potential/future.  Those selves who frequent moments close together on the timeline will 
have almost identical psychological natures. Their difference is what makes them 
independent selves but their similarities are what connects them. With respect to future 
selves, Parfit emphasises that despite the selves being different one must not discount the 
possibility of them one day having their psychological expression. He warns that a person 
must respect his/her future selves, preparing for and considering their potential and 
recognising that they may come into expression. This is based on the grounds that if it is 
ethically immoral to mistreat another person then so too must it be immoral to mistreat 
one’s own future person.64 Past selves can be divided into a series of categories: recently 
past selves, past selves and ancestral selves. An ancestral self is not connected to the 
current self; it shares no psychological expression. Instead, the ancestral self is only 
continuous with the current self because it shares a relationship through a chain of 
connectedness.
65
 
 
Parfit is essentially reductionist in his position on the self. He posits that the person 
is the same at two points in time if, and only if, the two points share the same 
psychological existence – memories and personality traits. It is not possible for selves of 
two moments to be the same in this sense because it takes only the smallest detail between 
the two moments to be different for the selves to experience different things and, therefore, 
differ in psychological essence. It is mental continuity and connectedness which unifies 
these states of a person into their full expression. Survival of the individual does not rely 
on whether someone is the same person but whether they share psychological continuity 
and connectedness with that person.
66
 
Time Slices –David Lewis 
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Strawson introduced the concept of multiple selves. Parfit argues that psychological 
continuity and connectedness are necessary for personshood. He explains that a person is 
not the same person from moment to moment but by using mental connectedness and 
continuity the nature of the person can be collected and described. Lewis provides an 
alternative picture of the way in which multiple selves can be unified into a single coherent 
being.  
Lewis agrees with Parfit that psychological continuity and connectedness are vital 
for survival.
67
 However, he disagrees with Parfit’s decision to disregard personal identity 
as necessary for survival of the self or person across time. Parfit believes that relational 
degrees are a necessary aspect of survival. Like Lewis, Parfit believes that in order for 
identity to be necessary part of survival it must have a 1:many relational interaction. 
However for Parfit identity has a 1:1 relational interaction while Lewis can define identity 
as having degrees of relation. 
Mental continuity and connectedness allows for relational degrees. So long as a 
percentage of the same nature is shared between the selves they can be grouped together – 
1: many or many: 1 ratio.
68
 Lewis disagrees with this description of identity and theorises 
that together identity, mental continuity and connectedness are necessary for survival. 
Lewis’ description of the boundaries of a person is contained within lawful causal 
dependence;
69
 that is, that each mental state is causally reliant on those preceding it for its 
psychological and physical nature. For Lewis, survival of an individual can be described in 
two ways. First case: the individual survives(that is, his/her mental life persists) if the 
future individual shares, in addition to recently gained psychological factors, the same 
psychological essence which makes the person distinct in that original moment. Second 
case: the individual survives if the same person survives – thus it is identity that matters. 
Lewis looks to unify these two forms of thought through a discussion of R-relational and I-
relational approaches to time slices. 
Mental continuity and connectedness comprise the relational nature between stages 
of persons or moments, time slices. Identity is the relationship between temporally 
extended continuant persons with stages at different times.
70
 When considering the Case 
One survivor of the current person with respect to mental continuity and connectedness, 
the question is whether the survivor is R-related to the current person; that is, whether the 
survivor shares any of the same psychological stages which are present in the current 
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person. The Case Two current person survives if the survivor is I-relational to the current 
person: that is, that the survivor shares those person stages which comprised the current 
Case Two person. The survivor will also have those person stages which evolved to get to 
the surviving state. I-relational is not quite the 1:1 relationship that Parfit perceives Identity 
to have. Lewis feels that I-relational is the persistence of identity because enough of those 
traits which distinguish identity are present in I-relation.  
For Lewis, a person is a maximal I-interrelated aggregate; that is, a person can only 
be all of its person stages - stages which are I-relational. To be I-relational is to be R-
relational, because no case, according to Lewis, of lawful causal dependence, lacks I-
relation or R-relation. Therefore an individual is a person if, and only if, it is a maximal R-
related aggregate of person stages.
71
 
Conclusion of Panpsychism and Multiple Selves Doctrines 
Panpsychism offers an informal theory of self which attempts to avoid the problems 
of Dualism, Reductionism, Eliminativism and Emergence theories in regards to self. Some 
self theories share the conclusions which Strawson draws using Panpsychism as his 
foundation. The focus of this chapter was primarily the mind-body problem of multiple 
selves, where other chapters have considered the problem of more than one type of 
substance existing in a person. Strawson, Parfit and Lewis require their readers to do an 
internal examination of themselves into how they perceive themselves and what aspects of 
themselves are necessary for their perceived existence or survival. It is these reflections 
when combined with the more formal theories of the self such as Reductionism for Parfit 
and Lewis and Panpsychism for Strawson that lead to a consideration of time slices and 
multiple selves. The question of multiple selves, like the two substance issue, has the 
potential to be a dissertation on its own. However, what can be taken from this brief look at 
the subject is that the self is not necessarily singular, despite its method of bringing unity to 
our perceptions. Unification is not the same as singularity. 
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Chapter Four 
The Locus Thesis of Self 
The basic claim of the Locus Thesis is that the self is an abstract idea which exists 
because it is a productive and informative way of providing an account for the individual. 
The self is neither physical nor non-physical; rather it is the illusionary product of a 
naturally narrative consciousness. It is a tool by which coherence can be brought to the 
onslaught of impressions from our world. Daniel Dennett is the central author and 
proponent of this approach with his work on the Convenient Lie.
72
 Other contributors to 
this thesis include John Locke, David Hume, Patricia Churchland, Paul Churchland and 
Elizabeth Anscombe. According to Dennett and the Locus Thesis, although the presence of 
self is a convenient and productive illusion, it can affect the world around it by being an 
abstractum, a fictional object. It plays a similar role in the person as the centre of gravity 
plays in the physical sciences.
73
 The final conclusion which Dennett presents is that the 
narrative nature of consciousness gives rise to the sense of self as an explanatory function 
to understand the world. 
Geisteswissenschaft (Soul-Science)  
Soul-sciences are philosophies and theories that arise from a number of different 
subjects such as psychology and history. They are theories that seek to account for human 
behaviour and nature with bases in the soul. Such theories can also be classified as Folk 
Psychology. Avicenna and Descartes can be said to ascribe to Soul-sciences as their 
philosophies use the soul as the underlying principle or explanation by which the most 
productive account can be given of human nature. Soul-sciences begin with the premise 
that the self is a most fruitful surmise from information gleaned from experiments which 
illustrate the nature of a person’s perceptions.74 It is informative, productive and simple. 
People feel and believe with certainty that they have a self, for how else have they been 
thinking about and reading these sentences? There must be a self doing these things. Soul-
sciences explain that when thought is given to the faculty which is unique to that person, a 
self is evident – that is, when interpreting an individual’s experiences and internal 
perceptions it is apparent that a self is present. Daniel Dennett argues that this approach is 
an illusion. He cautions theorists of the self and soul to look beyond what seems to be 
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obvious. He argues that what appears to be certain in perception, internally and externally, 
is not to be trusted. The belief that perceptions are not to be trusted is shared by many 
philosophers. This is why Descartes uses doubt as a method of discernment. This type of 
methodology arises from the realisation that we and our senses can be deceived. It can be 
said of Avicenna that he falls into the trap of the Soul-sciences, that is, it seems apparent to 
him that the body has a soul because of the evidence provided from the senses. 
Connectionism – Motivating the Locus Thesis 
Connectionism developed as an explanation for human cognition. It can be loosely 
described as a theory which attempts to describe the brain and mind using mathematical 
models. Connectionists do not, however, describe the interfaces between neural processing 
units with any great clarity. Rather, there is a focus on the outcomes of these processes, 
that is, higher cognitive activities such as reasoning. Two Connectionists, Paul Churchland 
and Patricia Churchland, use connectionism to support the claim that 
“thoughts are just points in hyper-dimensional neural state space 
and sequences of thoughts are trajectories through this space.”75 
The Churchlands hope to displace the Folk Psychological description of the brain, which 
says that the mind is homuncular in development.
76
 The idea of the mind as homuncular 
translates into the self governing of the brain. 
The Locus Thesis, as Dennett expresses it, has the basis that the self, while fictional, 
provides a concept of a fixed point by which people can slowly develop a framework of 
interpretation. The Churchlands’ description of thoughts within the mind gives the 
impression of randomness, if with apparent causality. Dennett combines the idea of a 
Connectionist brain with the concept of a tool by which mental impressions can be made 
distinct and coherent. He espouses this position because it provides a platform from which 
higher cognitive functions can arise and because he believes that this account offers a 
coherent explanation of our perceived impression of our experience of the world.  
Dennett – Connectionism Premise combined with the Self Tool 
Dennett’s position, that the sense of self is given through perceptions, is simple. 
Memory and current perceptions provide what appears to be a clear biography of a self or a 
self narrative. Dennett’s perspective of the self is diachronic in nature.77 A diachronic 
description looks at a topic and its progression over time. In the case of the self, Strawson’s 
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diachronic self has the nature of being persistent across time. That is, the same self 
presides over the individual’s entire life and that the self evolves and changes as additional 
experiences are added thereby deepening its definition. A synchronic description is similar 
to a diachronic description but should not be confused as equivalent. A synchronic 
description is made through an analysis of a topic at a single point of time. It does not 
examine its progression across time. The synchronic description is more closely related to 
Strawson’s episodic self. The episodic self examines the self at one point in time and does 
not include a progressional development in its description; rather, just those features that 
are necessary to describe the self in that moment. Such features are not restricted to current 
issues and can originate from anywhere on the individual’s timeline. The idea that 
Dennett’s self is diachronic is not stating that Dennett perceives the self to arise through a 
diachronic development rather that Dennett’s self tool appears to create a diachronic 
description of self. 
Consider the following three cases of Daniel, a computer, and a zombie. Daniel, a 
man and a person, examines his experiences through internal reflection and interprets his 
experiences as those of a self. The computer, like a Turing Machine
78
, receives all the 
information from its immediate environment and its output is precisely what one would 
expect if the machine were a person. For instance, in its output it would refer to itself as a 
person and it would make the same types of observations expected of a person such as “I 
am hungry” or “The draught from the window is making me cold and therefore I would 
like it closed.” These expressions are indistinguishable from those of a person although 
they are clearly coming from within a computer. So, the computer produces output which 
looks as if it comes from a person yet it has no understanding of the meanings of its output. 
The third case is that of a philosophical zombie. The zombie presents as identical to a 
person except that it lacks qualia. Qualia are those phenomena which distinguish an 
experience had by a complete person versus a zombie who, although it does not know what 
it is like to be a human, responds precisely as if it did know what it is like to be a person. 
So, the zombie provides the appearance of a self by its statements but has no knowledge of 
this self. These three characters all share a commonality: their output or their expressions 
of their experiences are identical. Thus what is available for interpretation is the same. The 
assumption which would follow is that each of the three has a self. Yet philosophers will 
debate whether the computer or the zombies do. Some will argue that while the zombie and 
the computer have no self, the person Daniel does. In fact it is his consciousness laced with 
qualia that distinguishes him from the other two. Dennett examines these three cases from 
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the perspective that they are each characters and it is the interpretation either of the 
observer or of the self that appears to provide the self.  
He offers a solution in this way. He explains that the selves who appear to be 
present in the zombie and the computer are akin to fictional characters. On receiving 
information from the zombie and the computer, the receiver interprets the information by 
creating an illusion of characters to which the ‘I’ pertains. For Dennett, Daniel is identical 
to the zombie and the computer. The output from him gives the impression of a self to both 
the external receiver and to himself. Through reflection Daniel interprets a self and the 
receiver of the information also interprets a self. Both Daniel and the receiver create a 
fictional character of this self. Dennett maintains that the brain does not know that it is 
doing this because it is a narrative machine. The brain according to Dennett uses narratives 
to predict and glean information from the world around it. It examines itself using this 
same method thus producing a self. It is interesting that while Dennett does not believe in 
the self other than as a useful tool of interpretation, his description of it is diachronic. That 
is, Dennett’s description of the nature of his self tool shares one of the forms of self 
anticipated by Strawson.
79
 
Consciousness in the Locus Thesis 
Initial thought regarding the soul (an antique phrase for the self according to 
Dennett
80
) arose to provide an explanation for those distinguishing features which identify 
a person as unique. The soul accounted for a person’s nature, mannerisms, morals and 
goals. Dennett explains that the self, can be used to provide an account for consciousness. 
This reasoning is Dualistic in nature. Avicenna
81
 and Descartes
82
 also accept methods 
which are dualist in nature. The Locus Thesis anticipates that, like the rest of the body, 
consciousness is a mechanism, possibly very complex but nevertheless one with 
mechanistic bases and quite clearly of the body. The behaviour exhibited by consciousness 
makes it appear to be non-physical when it is, in fact, a complex selection of physical 
functions.  
When considering consciousness and the self, there is a useful approach to 
distinguish what is referenced as the self by the Locus Thesis versus other theories
83
 of the 
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self. Daniel Dennett uses an analogy of Magic to illustrate the distinction. Dennett uses this 
analogy written by Lee Siegel
84
 to demonstrate the difference between the hard problem 
and the simple problem:  
““I’m writing a book on magic,” I explain, and I’m asked, “Real 
magic?” By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical acts, 
and supernatural powers. “No,” I answer: “Conjuring tricks, not real 
magic.” Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, 
while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real 
magic.”(Net of Magic: Wonders and Deceptions in India (1991), p. 
425) 
Real magic represents that which Soul-science philosophers call the hard problem.
85
 The 
hard problem is that the soul is an inaccessible phenomenon. The hard problem represents 
the awe-inspiring nature of the self and its role in the human. Dennett, on the other hand, 
supports the idea that the self is certainly magic but it corresponds to the magic of the 
magic trick. Magic tricks are magic because they convince the viewer of something 
through the power of suggestion and ‘sleights of hand’. They are deemed successful if an 
explanation is required to understand the trick. Likewise the self is similar to a magic trick 
in that it can be understood when it is broken down into its component parts.  
A magic trick has three main components: 
1. The Deception 
2. The Distraction 
3. The Revelation 
Arguments on the self have this general format: phenomenology provides data for 
which the self is an explanation. The self receives all the information which our senses 
provide. The distraction is provided by phenomenal examples where our senses can be 
doubted and therefore our judgement on the self. For instance, Descartes’ Cogito provides 
a good distraction. After all has been removed for which there is doubt, thought remains. 
Thought implies a thinker. Thus the revelation – a self –materialises.  
Dennett believes there is a dilemma to be found in the magic trick analogy while 
the philosophers of Soul-sciences only perceive a lemma. 
The Self Trick  
1. The Deception: There is an ‘I’ who perceives the internal and external world 
around us? 
2. The Distraction: The world is not always what it seems. 
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3. The Revelation: The self tries to make sense of the world around it. 
Soul-scientists believe that philosophical examination is required for the second part of the 
self trick analysis. They have no issue with the first part although they recognise that the 
answer may not be what they necessarily anticipate, but they do not challenge the idea that 
there is a ‘who’. The second part, that perception provides the distraction from the first part 
answer, is not denied by Dennett’s supporters or by the Soul-scientists. Perception 
experiments such as Dennett’s Tuned Deck86 and Change Blindness87, among others, lead 
philosophers and scientists to the conclusion that while our senses provide us with 
enormous amounts of information our trust in that information is misplaced. Tuned Deck 
was originally presented by the magician Mr Ralph Hull. In the trick he explains that the 
deck of cards is tuned and that through vibrations he can determine which card in the deck 
has been selected by the audience participant. Magicians tried to discern what the trick to 
this was but it was never discovered. It was simple. Hull simply changed his methodology 
between a range of simple tricks. Thus when others tried to decipher the trick it never 
seemed to fit into known methods. Consequently, the audience looked for a harder 
solution.
88
 Change blindness is the failure to notice changes in our environment from 
moment to moment. The most common change blindness experiments are the Flicker 
experiment (using a mask between two almost identical images) and the Mud-splatter 
experiment (where a visual overlay or distraction which resembles mud splatters on a car’s 
windscreen).
89
 Soul-scientists conclude that where perceivers experience separation from 
their perceived world, they are trapped behind a veil of perception which cannot be lifted – 
a regrettable position.  
Supporters of Dennett agree that there is a delusion in perception and that despite 
our apparent certainty, perception is fallible. However, they also require philosophers to 
use the same grounds to discount part one of the self trick. Dennett argues that our sense of 
certainty about there being a self which resides in us contains the same illusion as our 
perceptions. It is the sense which brings us certainty in a self just as it is our senses which 
bring us certainty in our perceptions. The sense of certainty does not imply fact; this is true 
of both the self and perceptions. Both can be illusory. 
The Locus for John Locke  
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Locke begins his exploration of the self with the premise that the mind is tabula 
rasa or a blank slate.
90
 This premise is the idea that the mind is completely empty 
preceding any impressions by the world, internal and external. He claims that there are no 
innate ideas. Thus the mind is the product of the world’s impressions. Using this premise, 
Locke proceeds to account for the self through the continuity of consciousness.
91
 For 
Locke, personal identity and the self are synonymous. The Narrativity Thesis, as described 
in the previous chapter in relation to Strawson, is the description of continuity of 
consciousness.  
It is the mind which is conscious. Ideas for Locke are the sole objects of the mind. 
Knowledge is, in turn, contained within these ideas and the relationship between them. If 
ideas are compared with no reference to the outside world then it is possible to know with 
certainty.
92
 However, all ideas are presented within the mind and, therefore, ultimately 
identified and determined by sensation and reflection and thus influenced by the outside 
world. Every state of consciousness, according to Locke, implies the self. The assumption 
that there is a self gives existence to it as it provides a reference for the impression. 
Locke never strictly draws a line between ideas and the self, therefore, never giving 
the self existence within the mind. In doing so he also anticipates that the self can never 
belong to the material of knowledge. So while Locke agrees with the existence of a self, he 
does not place it within the realm of knowledge, thus holding a comparable position to 
Dennett and his self trick. Locke does not go as far as Dennett in his discussion of the self; 
rather he limits it to his discussion of the role of ideas.  
Nature of a Self according to the Locus Thesis 
The self is a theoretical concept the knowledge and understanding of which allows 
for better predictions of behaviour. Like the centre of gravity in Dennett’s analogies93, the 
self, while being present in each human, does not correspond to a physical element. 
However, although the self is not physical this does not imply that it is non-physical; rather 
for the Locus Thesis this means that the self is theoretical. Descartes, Avicenna and 
Strawson discuss the potential nature of the self in terms of the physical versus the non-
physical. The Locus Thesis proposes that while these two natures are possible they do not 
include the possibility of a purely abstract concept such as the centre of gravity. 
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The centre of gravity as a fictional object is purely abstract. This means that 
although the centre of gravity has no existence in a physical sense, it has physical effects 
on the physical world: it is an abstractum with spatio-temporal effects. This characteristic 
clearly answers the age old problem of the Soul-sciences. The discussion of how to 
categorise the self is important and once again the centre of gravity analogy can be used to 
help clarify. If the centre of gravity is assumed to be the very atom over which it resides 
then one would expect the atom to have those attributes and yet when the atom is removed 
and analysed no attributes of the centre of gravity for the original object will be found. 
This is because it is a category error to assume that the theoretical concept of the centre of 
gravity is the same as the point on the object which is under discussion. It would also be a 
category error to assume that the centre of gravity is a non-physical object. With this in 
mind, in regard to the self, to avoid the category error made by thinkers such as Descartes, 
the Locus Thesis and Dennett claim that it is clear that the self is not a physical object 
within the person; rather, it is a fictional object.  
According to proponents of the Locus Thesis, the self is fictional both in its  
existence and in its role in the judgements it affects. Judgements regarding the self as a real 
and discernible thing occur because of the certainty people experience when they reflect on 
what they seem to be. The consciousness, in particular the stream of consciousness, weaves 
a story or narrative of the self and what it is. Whenever the self is considered the narrative 
becomes deeper and more complex. The result of this deepening is that the self is 
consistently becoming more determinate. The narrative nature of our consciousness 
provides the tools by which the illusion of the self evolves. The sense of self is, in fact, a 
convenient lie by which our consciousness orientates its thought for the most productive 
and beneficial arrangement of information regarding its world. When a person writes a 
book he/she creates fictional characters which readers perceive to have selves. The 
assumption is that the author must also have a self to create such convincing selves. The 
reality, however, is that through the narrative nature of the author and the reader, the 
characters in the book develop selves through inference. According to the Locus Thesis, 
the selves of the author, the reader and the characters in the book are all fictional.
94
 
Locus Thesis and Psychology 
The explanation provided by the Locus Thesis of the abstractum self and the 
fictional narratives which give rise to a sense of self also provides some clarity for 
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disorders such as Multiple Personality Disorder
95
 (or Dissociative Identity Disorder as it is 
called today). This disorder is where the experiencer has a tendency to easily dissociate 
from their usual identity and evolve additional identities. Often people suffering from 
Dissociative Identity Disorder cannot recall their other personas while frequenting another 
persona. Under this account of the self, a person experiencing the disorder has a defective 
or overzealous narrative faculty. Rather than evolving one centre of gravity (aka self) the 
person evolves multiple selves to account for their experiences. Sometimes when a 
person’s experiences are complex such as those which give rise to cognitive dissonance,96 
they are more easily explained by dual selves.
97
 
Dennett’s Two Prong Summary of the Self 
Dennett’s contribution to the discussion on the self is two pronged. Firstly, he 
challenges the internal description of the self through the Soul-sciences as the hard 
problem. The hard problem of the self is analogous to the problem of explaining real 
magic – it is supernatural or transcendental. The challenge of the hard problem is negated 
by the Magic Analogy.
98
 Dennett shows that rather than the self being like real magic it is 
in fact like a magic trick. The self through the power of suggestion is perceived as if it is 
central and very much a fact. The certainty that people experience when considering the 
self or ‘self trick’, results in belief. Belief, in turn, results in the successful deception of 
what is the self’s nature. It is clear that the self trick is very successful as the delusion that 
the self is a real thing is very prevalent and persistent. At this point it is important to realise 
that Dennett’s description of the self as an illusion can lead to the wrong conclusion. 
Dennett does believe in the self but rather than a self with a physical reference, the self is a 
fictional abstractum. This is not an idea to be confused with the fictional nature of a 
unicorn. The second argument by which Dennett attacks the self delusion is an argument 
by analogy with the centre of gravity.
99
 This illustrates how the self can have spatio-
temporal effects without being physical or non-physical. The analogy demonstrates the 
errors which can arise through incorrect categorisation. 
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Anscombe’s Linguistic Approach to the Locus Conclusion 
When examining the meaning behind words, linguistic formats can be used to 
uncover unexpected information. Anscombe explains that the use of the word ‘I’ appears 
most often in the role of a referring expression; that is, there is an assumption that when a 
person uses the word ‘I’ they are referring to their own self. The ‘I’ refers to the reflexive 
pronoun, the self. Anscombe unpacks the meanings of the word ‘I’ in her essay The First 
Person, explaining that there is a special form of the word ‘I’ which is not formally 
recognised by the English language but is in other languages. ‘I’, while often used as if it 
were a reflexive pronoun is, in fact, an indirect reflexive.
100
 
The indirect reflexive case refers to scenarios where the subject appears to refer to a 
second subject. However, unbeknownst to the first subject the second subject is also 
himself. Intentionality is used in discussions using ‘I,s’ to show conviction or evidence. 
For instance, it is intention in Descartes’ method of doubt that allows him to isolate the 
statement ‘I think’. Often the word ‘I’ is thought about in terms of a proper name because 
it often acts like a name. This creates a series of misleading assumptions. When ‘I’ is 
thought of as a proper name there is an assumption that it is referencing an object. 
Anscombe disagrees with this, explaining that ‘I’ is not typically used in this way. In the 
article G. E. M. Anscombe (1919-2001) by Duncan Richter this description of her work is 
given: 
“In her essay ‘The First Person’, Anscombe argues that the word I is 
not typically used to refer to an object, and so it does not refer to a 
non-physical soul or mind, but neither does it refer to a physical body. 
The word ‘I’ is not a name I call myself. It is not a name at all, even 
though it can appear to be one.”101 
Anscombe goes on to suggest that ‘I’ may be the proper name of the self in that for the ‘I’ 
to reference something there must be something that it is to be an ‘I’, such as having a 
self.
102
 Any referencing word is always used in the presence of its object, thus when an ‘I’ 
is used it is referencing its self. Each time it is reused in connection with the same self the 
self is re-identified – thus creating multiple selves.103 This links with Chapter Three’s 
discussion about Strawson’s accounts of the self. 
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This brief discussion of the linguistic nature of the word ‘I’ suggests the same 
approach to the self as the Locus Thesis. It provides an account whereby the impression 
given by the language we use and our perception of this language creates a false 
understanding of the ‘I’. This misconception is fundamental in that it is a mistake of 
classification to assume that the ‘I’ is referencing the physical individual or corporeal 
individual when it is referencing the conception of the individual elicited by the original 
statement. Consequently, it is possible to elicit the same physical or corporeal being more 
than once in a sentence and their comparative ‘I’s’ would not be referencing the same 
selves. Rather, two distinct selves may be being referenced which, at another point, may be 
redefined into a third and unified self when the mistake is identified. Note that this account 
of ‘I’ detaches the link between the I/self and the thinking being of the I/self. 
While Anscombe’s approach illustrates another way to see how the ‘I’ or self may 
provide a clarifying role in expressing the world around us, at the same time it is also the 
reason why our impression of the world is confused. The assumption that the ‘I’ is oneself 
and that it belongs to either the corporeal or physical body of the individual is incorrect. 
According to Anscombe, the ‘I’ is referencing the self – the centre of the concept of what it 
is to be a person. Incidentally, this means that a self is necessary for personhood. 
Causation and David Hume  
Hume suggests that as humans our biological history creates an impression that 
causality is fact. Hume describes this assumption as inherent. This belief is instinctive in 
that when we examine the world around us we describe it in terms of cause and effect.
104
 
These descriptions are supposed to provide us with a sense of certainty in that they deliver 
an account of why for situations. Ideally, the level of our conviction and security should 
arise from the relative provability of the situation. If the cause and effect could be shown to 
be fact and, therefore, completely knowable then we would have the highest level of 
conviction. However, it is not possible to know the first cause according to Hume. 
Therefore the very method by which we are divining knowledge of that cause and effect 
cannot be completely known either. Thus induction, causality is fallible. We assume, as is 
made evident by both Dennett and Anscombe, that we have selves. This assumption is 
fallible.  
Hume’s description of selves is that they are stable entities across time and that 
while we cannot be directly aware of our selves we can be aware of what we are 
experiencing at any given moment. Therefore our impression of ourselves and that on 
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which we base our assumption of self is simply a bundle of perceptions. Hume describes 
looking for the self beyond this collection of perceptions as akin to looking for a chain 
apart from its links.
105
 
Hume uses three tools
106
 in his exploration of ideas and perceptions which, in turn, 
lead to his concept of self. Hume’s first tool, the Razor, is that if a term cannot be shown to 
arise from an idea (which cannot be broken down into smaller ideas) then the term has no 
meaning. The second tool is the Microscope: the thesis that in order to understand a thing it 
must first be broken down into its simplest components, its simplest ideas. The third tool is 
called the Fork: for Hume truth is derived through sensations or through reflection. 
When considering these tools it becomes apparent that sensations and reflections 
lead to impressions. Impressions are the results of our imaginations and memories from 
which ideas arise. The initial impression in its simplest form is the idea that one must begin 
with in order to start the process of understanding. There are many terms in our world and 
if a term is found not to arise from an idea then it is meaningless and therefore does not 
contribute to knowledge. For Hume there are multiple impressions and ideas which find 
reference in the concept of the self. It is not as simple as one idea. As such, when searching 
for evidence of the self multiple impressions will be found to contribute to its formulation.  
Hume contributes to the Locus Thesis in that his discussion of the self as a bundle 
of perceptions and, therefore, ideas, has the fabric of the self as abstract not physical. His 
examination of causation offers yet another example of how starting with a fallible 
assumption that we have selves leaves the examiner with not only an unreliable impression 
but also with the false notion that the self belongs to the individual rather than being the 
product of a series of impressions received through the perceptions of that individual and 
therefore not of the individual. 
Conclusion of the Locus Thesis 
The essence of this Thesis in its most basic form is that the self originates from 
ideas in order to provide an orientation by which our perceptions of the world around us 
can be organised. The self does not reference a physical or non-physical object in nature. It 
is an abstract, fictional concept. Due to its role in interpretation of our perceptions, it is 
often mistakenly taken for something other than abstract. Consequently, a lot of time is 
needlessly devoted to what, according to the Locus Thesis, is its illusion of existence in the 
sense of an object.  
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Chapter Five 
Self Criteria and Distinctions 
It is to be hoped that in examining the contributions of the philosophers surveyed in 
Part One a foundation can be established from which a working prototype for the self can 
be advanced. This process of assessment will be done by considering what criteria are 
necessary and sufficient for the self - leading us to a statement about the concept. 
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 
Let us first consider Chapter One The Conceivability Thesis and those philosophers 
who contributed to it: Descartes, Armstrong, Lowe and Searle. 
Descartes explains that through introspection and the method of doubt the self can 
be discovered. His position is described as Substance Dualism. The Cartesian self refers to 
the being that has thought. Descartes’ examination of the mind-body problem leads him to 
the conclusion that the self and the body are distinct substances. This conclusion is drawn 
through the use of his perceptions which, despite his admission that they are fallible, result 
from his method of doubt. Substances have distinct phenomenological attributes and are 
persistent through time. For Descartes, the two substances are capable of independent 
existence and interact freely. Armstrong opposes Descartes’ conclusion that the self is a 
different substance from the body. The idea that behaviours through which the self appears 
seem special does not mean that there is a special cause. Armstrong’s endorsement of 
scientific method results in his desire to apply it to the consideration of the self. Empirical 
enquiry, although fallible, has what Armstrong describes as ‘good authority’, conviction 
among intellects. It is this conviction for which he searches with respect to the self. He 
anticipates that the world can be wholly described in physio-chemical terms thus, so too, 
should the self. For Armstrong, the self is the mental states that represent perceptions. 
Perceptions are, in turn, expressed in the body by physical states. These mental states can 
be called dispositions and they act as an internal cause for behaviours. Dispositions are a 
necessary part of physical states which cause actions. Therefore, the self appears to be part 
of the causal chain for actions. Within this approach consciousness is considered to be a 
perception of the mind. 
To those conditions necessary and sufficient for the self, Descartes contributes the 
importance of thought. Armstrong contributes the idea that the self is necessary for actions; 
that its values are found in the role it plays in the causal chain. 
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Lowe considers a self and a body which, despite being distinct substances, cannot 
exist independently of each other. The Lowean self is only perceived through its bodily 
expression. Without the body there would be no perception of self. The relationship Lowe 
posits is similar to the idea of conjunctive symbiosis.
107
 The self for Lowe is not a purely 
mental substance.  John Searle supports Biological Naturalism which, according to his 
argument, implies that mental phenomena (those phenomena which allude to a self) are 
lower neural processes. These processes are realised by higher cognitive process which 
reflect back on the processes. This reflection appears as consciousness. Searle states that 
the self is often taken to be a different substance due to linguistic confusion and intellectual 
ignorance. Our language still contains antiquated forms of words which imply 
independence of body and mind. This, combined with the fact that our intellectual 
advancement is not complete – we have more to discover regarding our understanding of 
the brain - results in the confused attempts by academics to suggest that the mind is a 
substance different from all other substances so far identified which are all contained by 
physical laws. For Searle, consciousness is private and accessed by those internal 
contemplations. The material world is objective and publically measurable. It is those 
private contemplations which lead us to feel that we know the self. So, Searle, like 
Descartes and Armstrong, use subjective conviction to lead us to the belief of a self. Searle 
describes the self as the cause of lower neural activity which precedes the action of higher 
neural activity. These higher cognitive processes have functions such as imagination and 
consciousness. Consciousness being the reflection of those mental phenomena expressed in 
the lower neural processes. 
Lowe highlights the importance of the coexistence of the self and the body. This 
necessary relationship is not denied by any of the theories so far suggested. Those people 
who believe in selves without bodies still consider them in concert with other bodies. So 
what is valuable to our discussion of the self is that it cannot be known without a 
consideration of the body. The self and the body are inextricably linked in some manner 
whether because they have a manner of conjunctive symbiosis or because they are one in 
the same thing. Either way, contemplation of one without the other is nonsensical. Searle 
offers a self which partakes in the causal nature of human behaviour. His theory is that 
while the self is not attainable it can be described by its effect on the causal flow of our 
bodies; that is, that the self is somewhere below our base neural processes and its 
expression is reflected in our internal analysis of these processes – consciousness. Searle 
offers the clearest form of the role reflection plays in the conception of the self. The self, a 
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purely internal concept or as a substance expressed through its relationship with other 
substances, may be present but has no existence without the possibility of it being reflected 
on. 
Chapter One suggests the following necessary conditions of the self: 
1. That it is considered in conjunction with its physical companion – the body;  
2. That thought provides the integral, if fallible, insight by which it can be described; 
3. That reflection is required for its identification; and, 
4. That the self is a participant of the causal chain which underpins behaviour. 
 
The Equilibrium Thesis implies that a balance epitomises the self. Rather than two 
distinct concepts representing the self and the material,  it is the product of a balance of the 
mental and physical. Avicenna, Aquinas and Hume consider this possibility. 
Avicenna’s soul, the archaic term for self, exists within the body to gain the benefit 
of being able to gather sensory data. Despite this, it is not part of the body. The two 
coincide because the relationship is mutually beneficial. Avicenna’s search for 
physiological clarity leads him to establish three different forms of the self. These are the 
Vegetative (which refers to those faculties fundamental to being a plant), the Animal (those 
faculties that represent the animal) and the Intellectus (the addition of those faculties which 
distinguish a human from an animal: the practical intellect and the theoretical intellect). 
The human soul contains all three aspects. Each aspect contains physical and abstract parts 
the interaction of which allows for those functions vital to the being’s existence. The soul 
resides within the body because the body provides it with physical data and expression. 
The body benefits from the soul because it allows the senses’ information to be decoded; 
thus rational responses can be made to the material world. It is the balance of the abstract 
qualities and the physical qualities that allow for the full life that an individual experiences.  
 Aquinas perceives the soul or self to be the essence of what it is to be human. For 
him, a human is comprised of a substance (the body) and the self is a subsistent of this.  It 
is reliant on the substances for its expression in the world despite being capable of 
independent existence. The body is the interface by which the self interacts with the world. 
Aquinas, like Avicenna, considers the soul to have three possible aspects, with the human 
soul comprising all three. The Vegetative type acts as the cause of the body’s physical 
activity. The second type, Sensitive, encourages reflection on the sensory input. The third 
type is called Rational or Intellectus and is responsible for the knowing and willing action 
upon sensory input. It makes sense of sensory perceptions and creates a coherent 
understanding of the data so that rational action can arise.  
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Hume considers the self to be the reference point of many impressions. His 
approach arises from an examination of the meaning of words; that each idea has 
references which define it. ‘The Self’ has many such interpretations, which is why 
responses to the question ‘what is it?’ are many and varied. Impressions come from either 
sensory data or from reflections. Impressions are the source of our ideas. For Hume, there 
is nothing greater than our perceptions (sensory input and reflections). Perceptions cannot 
be further reduced. For every idea there are a finite number of impressions and therefore 
perceptions which define it. The self is its perceptions. We cannot experience ourselves in 
a pure sense; we can only experience our perceptions. 
Chapter Two suggests these necessary conditions of the self: 
1.  That the important aspect of a being is that there is a balance between the abstract and 
the physical. This balance allows the self and the body their fullest expression and 
without each other both suffer; 
2.  That the self and the body are necessarily linked and the self is the owner of coherency 
within our perceptions; and, 
3. That it is our perceptions that both create ourselves and by which we know our selves. 
Perceptions come from reflections and the senses which form impressions. Impressions 
are sources for ideas. 
 
Panpsychism and the Multiple Selves Doctrine discusses the position that all matter 
has mental properties; that a blend of both physical and mental attributes is present in the 
world. The concept of the self is often considered in conjunction with the concept of time. 
This can lead to the idea of multiple selves. A self appears to be present across time 
therefore its definition must account for this feature. 
Strawson, like Hume, considers the self to have multiple impressions or 
expressions. The self is consciousness, the mental aspect of the human body. 
Consciousness deals in perceptions and thought. He opposes the psychological Narrativity 
Thesis claiming that it is a narrow definition which results in discrimination and potential 
psychological harm. Instead, he advocates two central types of self which, in turn, have 
subcategories. These types are diachronic and episodic. The episodic self is the self in the 
moment. It is not the same self that resides in any other moment because each moment is 
distinct and therefore the experience of the moment distinguishes the self from any 
previous moment’s self. This type of thought is in keeping with the belief that the self is a 
product of its perceptions. The diachronic self perceives itself through time as the same 
self, ever growing but none the less, the same.  Within each of these types a self may be 
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narrative or non-narrative in the way it perceives itself. Strawson’s self is consciousness, 
and his position indicates that consciousness can have different manners in which it 
assesses its perceptions.  
Parfit’s perspective is that there are an infinite number of selves because a self is 
distinct in any given moment from any other moment’s self. He asserts that the body and 
the self are the same substances, the self relying on psychological continuity and 
connectedness for it nature. It is the psychological expression of an individual. Each time 
the psychological nature changes, the self is reinvented. He uses psychological continuity 
and connectedness in order to unify selves that share common features; that is, selves 
which belong to the same body. Given that the body can change in innumerable ways, 
Parfit describes how to relate selves using psychological parameters; it is important to 
collect selves in groups because it allows for accountability and being morally upstanding. 
Lewis and Parfit are different in this fundamental way.
108
 For Parfit the question of 
an individual’s survival comes down to whether one endorses the view that it is mental 
continuity and connectedness or identity which must persist in order for survival to be 
achieved. For Parfit these two options are distinct in their nature and are mutually 
exclusive options. Parfit endorses that mental continuity and connectedness are necessary 
for survival. Parfit perceives identity as a 1:1 relation while mental continuity and 
connectedness has degrees and thus can have a 1:many relation. Therefore the two options 
are different in nature. Lewis differs from Parfit on the central idea that identity and mental 
continuity and connectedness are not reconcilable, that there is a mutually exclusive 
relationship. One method of identifying the nature of a concept is to search for its simplest 
form. Another is to identify what is necessary for its survival. According to Lewis the self 
relies on psychological continuity and connectedness and identity for its continued 
existence. There are two means by which people consider themselves to be preserved; the 
first, is if their current psychological existence is part of their future psychological 
existence. The second is a wider concept, that of identity. Survival, in this case, is the 
continued presence of the self between the current individual and the future individual. 
Lewis uses his discussion of I-relation and R-relation to illustrate that all stages and aspects 
of a person must both be simultaneously in I-relation and R-relation with their peers for 
survival. For Lewis both identity and mental continuity and connectedness are necessary 
for an individual’s survival. 
However parallels between the two approaches can be identified. It is these 
similarities which offer an insight into the nature of the self. Both Lewis and Parfit agree 
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that a self reliant on psychological continuity and connectedness is necessary for survival 
(although Lewis goes further to include identity as well). Lewis endorses a Parfitian 
position with respect to why a person generates multiple selves.  Consequently, he 
recognises that in the case of both identity survival and psychological survival, the self of 
now and the self of the future will not be the same. To describe the manner in which a 
person can survive, Lewis creates two derivative cases of survival: R-relation (the two 
psychologically akin selves) and I-relation (the two exact and precise selves).  
 
Chapter Three suggests these necessary traits of the Self: 
1. That there is a blend of the physical and the mental in all things, therefore, the self, too, 
is a blend of both the mental and physical natures;  
2. That the self can have many different forms of expression and manner in which it 
orientates the world for the individual. For example, the diachronic and episodic selves; 
3. Psychological continuity and connectedness and identity are considered to be necessary 
for the existence of the self; and, 
4. Given the possibility of an infinite number of selves, it is those traits which they share 
that provide coherence rather than those where they differ. 
 
The Locus Thesis offers a different position than our previous chapters in that it 
describes a self which is purely theoretical. To date, this exploration has progressed from a 
narrow discussion of a self in isolation from the body to a fuller picture of a rounded self 
that is part of its body and belonging to the perception of the individual. This chapter 
makes the further step into a self which is purely hypothetical. This movement in Self 
literature can be thought of as a discarding of the homuncular folk psychology and a 
progression towards a detailed description of the complex products of neural activity.
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Dennett describes the self as a theoretical construct which facilitates the processing 
of perceptions in an advantageous manner. The self offers an account of consciousness, 
and consciousness, like other bodily functions, is a mechanism. The self is of the body; it is 
not its own thing. The consciousness narrative nature produces the self. When it is 
meditated it becomes an even deeper aspect of the narrative therefore encouraging the 
interpretation that it is a distinct thing. It is, however, an illusion that the self is something 
other than a theoretical reference point of a being. It provides a mechanism by which our 
consciousness can be perceived in a coherent manner.  
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Anscombe offers the linguistic equivalent of the self illusion. She describes how 
the idea of self or ‘I’ appears to reference the corporeal body within its different forms. She 
explains that because the nature of the term ‘I’ is mistakenly used as if it were a proper 
name it is often missed that it is referencing the concept of the person. The self is necessary 
to personhood because it is the concept of the individual person. 
David Hume uses causation to illustrate how the self is a product of impressions, 
not something with an independent existence. The value of knowledge is determined by 
how much is understood of its causes and effects. The highest level of conviction would be 
attributed to that which we know all of the causes and effects. But this is an impossible 
hope, according to Hume, given we do not know the causes and effects of the very method 
of causation. Therefore, trust in causation as a measure of knowledge should elicit 
reservations. Thus knowledge which arises from causality is fallible. The assumption that 
we have selves is because of our apparent experience of self. We only experience the self 
in the reflection of our perceptions so it is simply a bundle of perceptions. It is abstract not 
physical or non-physical. The self is a product of impressions not of the individual 
themselves. 
Locke starts his explanation of the self from the thesis of tabula rasa. He explains 
that ideas are the content of the mind and these ideas and the relationships between them 
result in knowledge. Ideas are the product of impressions. Impressions come in two forms: 
reflections and sensory input. The state of consciousness implies a self in the nature of its 
orientation. The self does not belong to the material of knowledge, rather it is something 
else. It is through conscious reflection that a self appears; therefore, the self belongs to the 
content of the mind. 
The fourth chapter offers these necessary conditions for the self: 
1.  That it is a theoretical concept which facilitates the productive interpretation of our 
sensory input and reflections; and, 
2.  That it is the product of perceptions. Perceptions arise in two forms sensations and 
reflections.  
Chosen Stance 
Part One of this dissertation offers an examination of different ways in which the 
self has been defined so that a summary stance can be established. To recap: the self is that 
which seems to be essentially you. It is what the term ‘I’ references when it is used in 
discussions. The aim of this section is to identify those essential themes which the authors 
present in their discussions of the self. It is hoped that these themes will provide a coherent 
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image of the self which can be used when examining psychological disorders wherein the 
sense of self seems impaired. 
Expression of Self:  
The contention over the body/self relationship provides our first necessary 
condition for the self. That is, the relationship between the body and self is necessary to the 
degree that they are equally reliant on each other for their fullest expressions.
110
 The 
relationship between body and self is different from those conditions necessary for the self 
because it is a relationship of equality; it is like the symbiotic mutualistic service-service 
relationship between the sea anemone plant and the anemone fish.
111
 What is apparent time 
and again is that the self is seen through the body. The nature of this relationship is not 
entirely clear but what is obvious is that the self and the body are necessarily connected. 
The discussion of body and self in Part One maps the progress of the self between theses 
where it is a non-physical substance
112
, the same substance as the body
113
, a different 
substance to that of the body, and finally an abstract aspect of the body, a theoretical idea 
which facilitates the creation of a coherent manner by which the body’s perceptions can be 
processed
114
. Each of these forms requires the presence of the physical body in order for 
the self to be expressed in the physical world. While some seek to establish that it may be 
capable of independent existence apart from the body, none of these positions anticipate 
that it can affect the physical world without the body. Therefore, in order for the self to 
exist in the physical world it needs a physical portal such as the body. The body is 
something which receives sensory perceptions. It is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the self’s expression in our perceivable world. Without the body nothing can be known of 
the self. So the body will form our precursor requirement for the self.  
The Three Necessary and Sufficient Criteria of a Self are: 
1. The being is conscious (awake and experiencing). 
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The first criterion is one that distinguishes that which is alive but inert (a lack of 
internal mental activity), such as plants, from that which is alive and experiencing things, 
such as infants. This is a difficult criterion as it skirts arguments for what it is to be alive as 
well as arguments of what it is to experience. However, for the sake of this description, the 
words are to be taken at face value. At first glance this criterion may appear to include too 
many things to be of any use in narrowing down what it is to be a self. It does, in fact, 
significantly reduce the amount of work which could arise from later questions, such as 
excluding people who are dead. The first criterion also excludes people who are in a brain 
dead state but may have a functioning body. This is because the brain acts as a necessary 
part of the physical being for the collection and preservation of sensory information. 
This yet to be addressed aspect of the self is that it is aware, as in conscious that it 
is absorbing sensory input. The recurring theme in all of the theses has been that in order to 
make any progress with the discussion on self, the being must absorb and hold onto 
perceptions. Each of our chapters considers theses where it is clear that our perceptions are 
fallible.
115
 However, perceptions form the foundation by which the self is expanded. Hume 
explains that perceptions both create and expose the self.
116
 The perceptions create the self 
because their rational interpretation is necessary for the being’s survival. Consequently, the 
self functioning as the interpretive tool was devised.
117
 Perceptions expose the self in that it 
is only when our perceptions are examined that the concept of the self becomes clear. It is 
in the perceptions that we perceive a self. Perceptions are divided into two categories those 
which are senses and those which are reflections (Both forms of perception will be 
addressed in the Criteria for a self.).
118, 119
Perceptions from the senses are simple external 
input from the physical world. Reflections are the more complicated form of perception 
which originate from internal interactions with the sensory data. Thoughts are the contents 
of the consciousness. Impressions have two forms: reflections and senses. Impressions 
form our ideas. Ideas lay the ground for the content of our consciousness.
120
 The 
perception of perception leads us to our second necessary condition of the self: reflection. 
2.  The being has a reflective consciousness; a consciousness which can be reflected on. 
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A reflective consciousness is the development discussed earlier of having two types 
of consciousness in order to side step the infinite regress. It is a state of consciousness 
which allows consideration of what one is conscious of. The first criterion has the person 
being aware of the taste of food in his/her mouth, the pressure of the chair under his/her 
bottom, the touch of clothes. The second criterion allows for a consideration and 
examination of these experiences. It allows the person to realise that the taste of the food is 
unpleasant and to be avoided in future. A reflective capacity allows for storing and 
learning from phenomenal experiences. It is key to having that sense of ‘I think’.121 
Consciousness is the perception of our own state of mind.
122
 Perceiving our 
perceptions implies reflection. Reflection is the central manner in which the self can be 
observed. Descartes’ method of doubt begins with the isolation of perceptions of which he 
could be certain.
123
 Reflection is the method by which the self can be identified. The 
reflective consciousness is not only required for identification but it is the process by 
which perceptions are examined and sorted. Without the reflective capacity our perceptions 
will remain simply that, they will not have descriptions. Descriptions of our perceptions 
allow for logical categorisation which, in turn, facilitates informed action. The self forms 
part of the causal chain which is responsible for our behaviours.
124
 
Reflections are the second form of impression which makes it one of the sources of 
our ideas or thoughts.
125
 Each of the theses regarding thought identifies the capacity to 
reflect as vital. Some do not put it in terms of reflection, such as Parfit and Lewis whose 
descriptions of psychological continuity and connectedness and identity rely on the 
capacity to look back through time at what has been and recall what has previously been 
considered. Or, in an alternative form, the ability to project potential future scenarios 
requires the skill to recall past cases which are similar and project variants of the case 
being considered.  The ability to examine potential scenarios or past cases requires 
reflective consciousness thereby making it a necessary principle of the processes needed 
for survival as seen by Parfit and Lewis. Criteria One and Two refer to thoughts. Thoughts 
are the currency of impressions and are fundamental to the faculties which exhibit the self. 
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3. The being is aware that it is him/herself that contains the first two consciousnesses 
and not just the universe as such. 
The third and possibly the final criterion is, in some ways, the most important as 
well as the most complex. It allows individuals to become aware of themselves as separate 
beings within a greater environment. Up until this point the person is everything. All the 
phenomenal information and internal assessment is that which fills the world. All input is 
for the purpose of acting on the individual as opposed to the individual being like a 
phenomenon within a great host of phenomena. Awareness is that which allows persons to 
realise firstly, that they are not the universe and secondly, that they are not alone in the 
universe. Each child goes through this stage as he/she learns to influence actions of a 
parent; realises that the parent, when not in sight, is still in existence; and learns to lie. 
Each of these discoveries leads the child to realise and evolve a sense of personal self. 
The third criterion necessary for selfhood is the ability to identify the two 
consciousnesses as being of the individual. It is important that the individual isolates 
him/herself as distinct from the world. This process occurs when individuals establish their 
personal perception of themselves. A personal concept of self can be established in a 
variety of ways. Strawson describes how different forms of self evolve. He describes a 
diachronic and an episodic self and how these forms can help shape a person’s processing 
of the world.
126
  The principle of identifying oneself is to understand what it is that is 
required for survival. The Multiple Selves Thesis illustrates two forms through which 
survival is considered successful. The first is psychological continuity and connectedness 
and the second is the broader form of identity. People value those things which allow that 
which they consider to be themselves to be continued. Psychological continuity and 
connectedness refers to those mental aspects of persons that express who they consider 
themselves to be. In each state of being there is a unique measure of what it is to be that 
person in that moment.
127
 What it is to be a person is different from moment to moment 
therefore it is a different person in each of those moments. An individual’s persons are 
grouped by their similarities; those sharing almost all of the same psychological expression 
have psychological connectedness, that is, there is an overlap in what it is to be those 
people. Those sharing a limited amount of psychology are considered to be 
psychologically continuous. They share the same stream, in that at some point, the two 
distant peoples’ connected persons share a connection. These connections may be multiple 
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times removed. Identity, like psychological continuity and connectedness, is the other form 
that people consider when hoping to survive.
128
 It offers a manner which includes a 
physical as well as psychological expression in the perception of what an individual 
pertains to be. The manner of survival is not as important as the fact that the person has 
isolated the idea of his/her self and desires whatever that is to be preserved. When 
individuals can acknowledge themselves as distinct from the world around them they gain 
the capacity to determine their actions with the motivation to survive rather than simply 
exist. Identification of self allows for deliberate and focussed action; it offers motivations 
and desires. 
The Criteria of the Self 
Three criteria of self have been established and one symbiotic necessity for the 
expression of self.  
 
Expression of Self:  
The expression of a self needs a body. The body and the self are inextricably linked. 
The three necessary and sufficient criteria of a self are: 
I. Consciousness (being awake and experiencing). 
II. Reflective consciousness; the consciousness which can be reflected on. 
III. Awareness; the being is aware that it is him/herself that contains the first two 
consciousnesses and not just the universe as such.  
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PART TWO 
Insights into the Self through the Other 
Chapter Six 
Finding the Self in a Complex World 
In this section the two central approaches that have directed thinking in the study of 
the self will be examined: the social description and the evolutionary or phenomenal 
description. An outline of the approaches will be given, followed by an examination of the 
self using the approach together with the philosophers and psychologists who take this line. 
In the discussion it will become clear that there are significant overlaps between the two 
theories as they attempt to source the self. 
The Social Description 
The social description is one which has been used by psychologists and 
philosophers alike but which has remained more prevalent in psychological descriptions of 
the self. In essence, it is the claim that a self is developed and provided by an individual’s 
social immersion.
129
 Some psychologies describe infants as ‘clean’ or ‘empty 
impressions’.130 They explain that it is through the infant’s experiences that individuality is 
impressed and a character begins to emerge from the reactive behaviours. Philosophers 
such as Locke have also presented tabula rasa ideas. The result of an empty slate concept 
for an infant is that it is the environment together with social interactions that provide the 
building blocks which culminate in a sense of self. Such an approach to the self is 
cumulative but the approach has not yet distinguished the nature, number or combination 
of experiences required for the development of a self, just that there are imprinted 
experiences. This means that prior to the unidentified set of experiences; the infant is 
without a self. 
The clean slate notion suggests that a self will appear with the addition of 
experiences. Locke explains that the essence of tabula rasa is that an individual is the 
author of his/her own soul.
131
 The social approach goes further in that it contends that the 
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self comes from the experiences which assume a self in their gestures.
132
 When watching 
interactions between any adult and infant there is a clear assumption of self in the child by 
the adult. This is due to the viewer’s belief that the baby is human and thus is as much a 
person as the viewer is and therefore will think and behave like him/her.
133
 This is a type of 
personification seen in many situations such as a pet owner claiming their pet missed them 
while they were away on holiday. However, as the child, if all of your experience with the 
world leads you to believe that you are a self then it makes sense that your internal 
perception of yourself will appear indicative of having a self. Thus society does appear to 
play an influential role regarding the recognition of a sense of self and how that self might 
be expressed and connected to its environment.
134
 
Developmental psychologists propose timelines of developmental stages, which 
illustrate how an individual’s psychology or mental state evolves. Michael Lewis proposes 
five periods of development with direct consideration of a Self-Other relationship.
135
 The 
Self-Other relationship is that which exists between the individual in question and the 
people interacting with them. In the following chapters some time will be spent discussing 
cases where individuals’ selves start to suffer and there is a loss of the ability to identify 
others as selves.  
Lewis’s Five Periods can be enumerated as follows:136 
1. The first period covers zero to three months, during which infants learn to 
differentiate between themselves and their primary caregiver. They begin to evolve 
a means-ends relationship. As the caregiver and the infant evolve, a relationship 
through ‘need satiation’ 137  begins to bloom. This type of relationship lays the 
foundations for tender relationships in the future. Through the interactions between 
the infant and primary care giver the infant’s physical needs and mental needs are 
satisfied through positive interactions such as kind eye contact, gentle touching and 
vocalisation. 
2. The second period is between the ages of three months and eight months.  During 
this stage, infants start to test the means-ends relationship by testing their 
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environment and its responsiveness to their own actions. This feedback results in 
them developing a sense of themselves as an object with a sense of personal agency. 
The caregiver’s responsiveness helps evolve the social agency which will later be 
used in building other relationships. It is also at this stage that social anxieties 
appear because the child can start to distinguish between familiar and unfamiliar 
care givers. 
3. In the third period (eight to twelve months) it becomes clear that the type of self the 
infant is experiencing is not one which is private or one which is isolated just to the 
body of the infant. Rather, the self is something that has social meaning; other 
people are necessary to its expression and existence and they are not physically 
attached to the individual.  
Lewis describes how over the first three periods the infant’s sense of self 
slowly develops initially through its connection to the primary caregiver, in many 
ways sharing the self provided by that person until slowly distinguishing its own 
self from that of the care giver and realising its position in the world around it. 
During this period the infant begins to understand that inner experiences can be 
shared with another individual. The infant also begins to monitor the attention of 
others with respect to itself- an ability which when combined with ‘reading’ and 
sharing emotional information with others begins to provide feedback to the child 
about its lovability and worth. 
This period also involves the beginning of object permanence. At about nine 
months old the infant begins to recognise that an object is permanently present 
regardless of whether the object can be seen. This understanding is applied to the 
primary care-giver as infants begin to recognise the location of the primary care-
giver as they move around. It is also beginning to be applied to themselves for it is 
during this period of development that infants start to respond to their own 
appearance and facial expressions in the mirror, thereby beginning to develop 
personal self permanence. 
 
4. The fourth period covers 12 to 18 months and involves the development of stronger 
internalisation of objects and people that assists in problem solving skills. The child 
begins to develop consistent recognition of itself in the mirror. It also begins to 
exhibit social individualisation and a sense of self-consciousness together with the 
starting of regular self recognition. 
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5. The fifth and final period involves the completion but not termination of the fusion 
between the self of the caregiver and the child. These two selves are reliant and 
share a self reference point as the child begins to individualise and develop its own 
self reference point. If this process happens prematurely then the child is 
susceptible to low self esteem and chronic stress. 
 
Analysis of psychologists’ studies of developmental processes such as this five stage 
developmental progression provides a background and insights for how a self comes into 
actuation. The developmental process provides sign posts for the self, in that as the 
behaviours develop, the self seems to appear. This is the point at which the origin and 
nature becomes complicated in the discussion of the self.
138
 It will also provide some 
understanding when consideration is given later in this dissertation as to why certain 
people have not developed selves and why others have lost them.  
The Phenomenological Description 
Both philosophical and psychological proponents agree that the phenomenological 
description or introduction to the nature of the self is an established starting point 
providing understanding of the self. This approach is simply that it is our 
phenomenological experiences that inform us of the self or of our selves. It is a person’s 
senses - sight, touch, hearing, smell and taste - that lead him/her to the conclusion that 
there is a self which is receiving these phenomenal influences. This self is not just a body 
that receives these sensations because there are internal sensations such as hunger and still 
more deep and personal sensations such as what it feels like to think and what it is like to 
be sad. These phenomenal experiences appear to show that there is a self housed within the 
body - an experiencing, perceiving thing which owns the phenomenal input.  
Phenomenological information is pressing in on our senses every moment of our 
lives with the strongest and most prevalent registering on our receptors. However, when 
experience is considered it is apparent that certain phenomenal information is prioritised, 
which means that the information is filtered and brought together in a cohesive 
arrangement so that what is considered most important is identified. Those parts of our 
perception which are considered ‘most important’ are identified through a combination of 
deliberate and directed focus as well as what is considered important by our natural 
instincts. A self could either be what unifies our phenomenological information or be a 
product of unified phenomena. According to Dennett the self is that which allows for a 
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unifying interpretation of the world around you; that is the self provides a theoretical 
concept by which the phenomenological can be made into a coherent informative 
picture.
139
 
If the self is what unifies phenomenal information then this provides a strong 
evolutionary reason as to why there is a self. A self allows individuals to make sense of 
their environment and of themselves within that environment. People who can assess and 
prioritise their situation are much less likely to become overwhelmed by it and therefore be 
better equipped to survive. However, this would suggest that any being with a unified 
method of dealing with phenomenological information would have a self. This is an 
extremely inclusive way of defining the self and opens the way for a wide range of  
prospects which must now be considered to have selves. From snakes to geniuses a self is 
common and present. This is hard to conceive given that a self is commonly considered to 
be a complex high level cognitive capacity which is not wide spread or present in all 
creatures. Looking at the thesis that the self is a result of unified phenomenology we see 
that unification and sorting of information result in a sense of locus or a focal point. 
Sorting and assessing information is a patterning which in turn suggests a motivation. 
Between a motivation and a locus, a sense of uniqueness and individuality arises which are 
precisely the types of characteristics people describe when trying to express what they feel 
their self might be. 
The phenomenological description firmly places the self as originating from within 
the body, which means that you could not leave yourself behind. This is certainly an 
intuitively appealing idea, however, it is not entirely consistent with the social 
description’s presentation of the self. The social description depicts a self which is 
intimately linked to its social environment. It suggests that the people and interactions 
experienced by a self are what provide a sense of self. The self is more a social existence 
or participant than a body part. The result of this is that the link between the body and the 
self is more tenuous than the phenomenological approach would imply. 
There are two aspects of the phenomenological approach that weaken its ability to 
provide a convincing account of the self. The first is that of fringe feelings and the second 
is that an explanation must be provided for the link between two moments each full of 
phenomenal data. Up to this point, discussion of phenomenal input has been of a direct 
cause and effect type of experience. I feel pain because I have a tack in my foot. A fringe 
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feeling
140
 is something which has a less apparent cause; it is harder to describe and isolate. 
It is like the feeling of having a word on the tip of one’s tongue but not being able to say it.  
The problem with fringe feelings is not that they debase an idea of self; in fact, they are 
used to reinforce the existence of self. Rather, they are a problem because their 
phenomenal roots are less clear and, therefore, they threaten the premise that it is 
phenomenology alone which provides and defines selfhood. The second issue is that of 
connecting phenomenal information together in a coherent manner. Two questions arise 
here: how to collate multiple sets of input from one object to provide a complete image of 
that object; and, how to connect phenomenological input from one instance to another in 
order to express a coherent story. Dainton provides an explanation for the latter question 
but his account is ad hoc in nature.
141
 The consequence of this problem is that again the 
phenomenal approach while adding much to the description of self does not give a full and 
cohesive explanation. 
Apart from these two main approaches there is a third which can lead people to 
study the self - personal experience or specific medical case studies. These studies, while 
bringing a colourful angle to the study of the self, will not be used as a primary platform; 
rather, they are best used to illustrate the more unusual features of the self. For instance, 
cases such as Phineas Gage
142
 provide a clear example of how major change in the 
neurological make-up does not necessarily have predictable effects on the behaviour of the 
individual. This type of case informs understanding both of brain plasticity and 
topographical descriptions of the brain. In what follows, consideration will be given to the 
two psychological disorders of autism and schizophrenia. Viewing them in the light of the 
phenomenological and social approaches will, it is hoped, further contribute to the 
understanding of the self.  
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Chapter Seven 
Disorders Elucidate the Self: Autism 
Autism and schizophrenia can be described as disorders of the self in that their 
expression interrupts those anticipated behaviours in which the self is usually expressed; 
that is, these two disorders affect people’s ability to express themselves using language and 
behaviour. Thus, not only is the individual’s perception affected but also the perception of 
others towards them. The following two chapters will examine autism and schizophrenia. 
This section aims to look at each disorder to learn what manner of self, if any, can be 
identified within these individuals. Looking for a self in people with disabilities has 
practical implications since it promises to include them in contexts from which they might 
otherwise be excluded. Offering inclusion to someone with a disability is akin to offering 
them a chance of acceptance.  
The Self in Introspection and Communication 
One of the challenges in discussing the self is that it is both identified and 
expressed through introspection (reflection) and communication (behavioural expressions 
such as language). That is, a self can be located through words as well as through a 
thoughtful consideration as to who or what persons perceive they are as they look at the 
idea of the self. The words and thoughts allow one to discover the existence of a self as 
well as providing a trail for an examiner to identify that self. While they are only 
expressions of the self, they also provide us with the evidence of its presence. This is 
further complicated by the fact that according to theories of developmental psychology it is 
the infant’s communication with its more fully cognitively developed carers that teaches 
and assists the infant’s brain to develop and evolve. When primary care givers interact with 
infants they immediately personify the infant and extend the assumption that the infant 
must have a self because of the belief that every infant will grow into someone like the 
carers. This brings us to a common misconception held within our society. Because verbal 
communication is the mode by which the self is identified within people, it is often 
assumed that an individual without the ability to communicate verbally has no self. 
(Introspection was not mentioned above because we only know the introspection of 
another through their verbal communication of it.)  This is a misconception because it 
involves two false presuppositions: firstly, that verbal communication is the only key to the 
self and, secondly, that if an individual cannot communicate his/her private world in a way 
that is readily understood, it is assumed that he/she is without that world and what comes 
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with it; such as a self.  However, linguistic communication is not the only method of 
demonstrating the self. Non-linguistic behaviour can also provide cues by which the self 
can be identified. In using autism as a case study, where those faculties of communication 
which classically bring us the knowledge of self are impaired or absent, attention can be 
focussed on other faculties which may indicate its presence. 
People often use communication as the primary guide to believing another 
individual has a self. Without communication (in a form recognised and anticipated by the 
perceiver) people are often judged as less than whole; without a self. The assumption that 
verbal communication is the only way of knowing a self and that without such 
communication there is no self causes people to disregard others who have unusual 
manners of communicating. This is flawed reasoning, but it is also the reasoning which 
underpins most of the classical examples of discrimination found in history. People with 
psychological disorders often have differing behaviours which result in society’s censure 
and their partial or full exclusion from that society.
143
 The problem in the reasoning is that 
the onus of evidence is placed on the wrong point. This logic states that because one of the 
modes by which a subject is expressed is absent, the subject itself must also be absent. 
Likewise, verbal communication, while a method by which the self can be expressed, is 
not a trait of the self. This is a case of using fallacious reasoning: denying the antecedent.  
The Equilibrium of the Self 
Equilibrium between the internal/private world and the phenomenal/external world 
is what allows for normal development. People who can perceive both worlds and use this 
understanding to assist their function do not have those deficits experienced by an 
individual with autism. This can be seen in the types of symptoms classic to the disorder of 
autism specifically those associated with social interactions.
144
 People who do not have a 
balanced interface between these worlds experience a fracturing in function within the 
external world. However, lacking an equilibrium does not necessarily result in the lack of 
either world.
145
  
First, let us examine how communication acts as the interface between the internal 
and external worlds. The phenomenal world is the physical world or external world, 
discussed in Part One of this dissertation. Part One conveyed how information can be 
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gleaned about the self through that world. Descartes concluded that as the self is not 
physical it must be non-physical. We learn from the flaws in his theory that because one 
characteristic is not the case it does not mean that its opposite is the case. It is possible that 
the ‘I’ is simply a cohesive mechanism by which logic can be applied to our phenomenal  
world.
146
 
Avicenna explains that behaviours can be accounted for either through 
phenomenological or abstract faculties. Abstract faculties belong to the internal part of the 
person while the phenomenal belongs to the external. Avicenna proposes that balance 
between the internal and the external influences on the person combine to make the aspects 
of the self.
147
 We will be using his thesis about the balance between the phenomenal world 
and the internal world as we further the discussion. Strawson proposes that introspection 
can inform us as to the shape of and the nature of the self. It provides insight into how each 
personal self is of best service to its owner. He also maintains that despite the different 
forms of self appearing to lead to specific ethical and good life criteria, different shapes of 
self do not imply error or a complete lack of self shapes.
148
 So, the personal expression of 
the self leads us to some knowledge of  it as a philosophical concept. It would appear that 
the self is a personal element which has evolved within each person to provide guidance 
and coherence to their own particular expression of life. Dennett disputes the idea of the 
self as a non-physical or physical thing. He submits the thesis regarding the centre of 
gravity as a parallel for the role that the self plays for a person. The self is a theoretical 
concept by which the brain can make sense of the world. The theoretical concept allows for 
a more succinct approach to interpreting the phenomenal world. The self concept also 
creates a tool that helps to predict the behaviour of others.
149
 
G. Stanghellini and M. Ballerini (2004) introduced the term ‘idios kosmos’.150 
meaning the private world of the individual.  They described the autistic tendency to reside 
solely in this private world and how those individuals with schizophrenia fluctuate between 
‘residing within’ their idios kosmos and the phenomenal world. The idios kosmos or private 
world becomes the reality for someone who is residing in this state. An individual who has 
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developed a balance between their idios kosmos and the phenomenal world is well adjusted 
as they can respond to each of the worlds’ expressions by tempering the two states. The 
disorders of autism and schizophrenia are described by Stanghellini and Ballerini as 
fractured. The idea of fracturing comes from their description of the idios kosmos as 
having four interfaces by which the balance with the phenomenal world is maintained. An 
individual with one of these disorders experiences deficits in these four interfaces. 
The balance of the idios kosmos enables people to live in the phenomenal world as 
reality. For someone with autism their idios kosmos experiences emotional drifting, 
semantic drifting, a loss of an ethical or common stand on existence and ontological 
incompleteness.  Below is described the effect of these four functions and their expression 
in the external world.
151
 
1. Emotional Drifting is the characteristic which separates emotional feedback from 
physical and/or linguistic cues. For people with autism this results in a reduction of 
participation in the social world. 
2. Semantic Drifting occurs when the individual experiences a progressive and 
pervasive deconstruction of their toolbox of language semantics. 
3. The ethical factor expresses how people with autism move away from accepted 
common sense perceptions and interpretations of behaviour and phenomena 
resulting in peculiarities in value attributions and prioritising.  
4. Ontological incompleteness is essentially a shattering of self coherency causing an 
imbalance between their inter-subjective and intra-subjective interpretations. 
When these four areas are functioning properly in a person, a healthy balance is 
established between the internal and the external world. This balance allows people to live 
as if their perceived external world is their reality. A disruption in this processing, such as 
for a person with autism, results in a containment or permanent retreat within the activities 
of their private mental life. When the balance between the internal and external world is 
steady the process of expression within the idios kosmos not only allows for coherent 
expression of the individual in the phenomenal world but also provides the means by 
which the phenomenal world is coherent for the individual. Disorders of communication 
and social expression such as autism arise out of fractures within these faculties thus 
impairing the individual’s ability to both interact and successfully perceive the phenomenal 
world. This, in turn, translates to social isolation as the expression in the external world is 
deemed as ‘different’. The two central fractures between the idios kosmos and the social 
world or phenomenological world for those with autism are: firstly, that their capacity to 
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correctly identify the similarities between themselves and others leading to the individual 
extending the assumption of selfhood to those around them is severely impaired. The 
second fracture is the result of a disruption of their pre-reflective and non-propositional 
attunement by which the idios kosmos or the private mental life of the individual are 
expressed. During normal development, links are developed between different words and 
ideas. For instance, the colour red is often associated with the word ‘anger’. For someone 
with autism these common associations are not laid down and established in the same 
manner, therefore their queued responses to stimuli often differ from their normally 
developing peers.
152
The pattern of association in the brain can be described as a mind map 
or keyboard. The shared keyboard of mental life provides a basis for communication which 
is degraded for persons living with autism; therefore their ability to respond appropriately 
is also disrupted.
153
 
Is there a Self in Someone with Autism? 
Theory of Mind 
The Theory of Mind is an important part of the discussion about the self and autism. 
Theory of Mind refers to the faculty required to appreciate another person’s perspective. It 
is the capacity to impute beliefs to others.
154
 This, in turn, requires second order 
representations; that is, the ability to hold both one’s own beliefs and another’s beliefs 
within oneself. The ability to identify another’s beliefs facilitates the process of social 
integration. It means that the individual can know in a loose sense what another person 
feels, wants and believes.
155
 The point of contention which will be examined in this section 
is whether the third criterion of self is equivalent to the Theory of Mind capacity or 
whether they are distinct.  
Second-order representations constitute part of the category of thoughts which are 
higher-order. A higher-order thought is one which is of another thought. That is, they bring 
thoughts into consciousness. A higher-order thought occurs when it confirms a lower order 
thought.
156
 For instance, when a person is hurt he/she experiences pain. When the 
individual can state that he or she is experiencing pain it is a higher-order thought. The 
thought behind the statement asserts that the pain is there. A higher-order thought is like a 
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testament or reinforcement of something which is already part of the person.
157
 A second-
order thought is where the individual is not only aware of his/her own thoughts but also of 
the thoughts of another. To be capable of perceiving what another person could possibly be 
experiencing or thinking is the distinct feature that fails to develop in autism. Theory of 
Mind is the result of second-order thoughts. Theory of Mind or the ability to anticipate 
another’s intentions or beliefs form an integral part of successful social interaction. 
Without this ability social interactions become extremely foreign.  The idea that 
individuals with autism treat objects and people alike arises from the deficit in their Theory 
of Mind.
158
 
Autism is a disorder where its core features are impairments in socialisation, 
communication and spontaneous imaginative play.
159
 These areas of impairment are each 
distinctly linked to the capacity which Theory of Mind affords in an individual. 
Socialisation and spontaneous imaginative play requires the individual to attribute 
characteristics to an object or person and then interact with those characteristics. It requires 
the faculty of second-order thoughts. Likewise communication beyond need satiation relies 
on the individual understanding the value of interactions with another person. Someone 
who is not aware of the potential differences between him/herself and others would not 
experience the curiosity needed to discover more about another person. People with autism 
cannot imagine that other individuals have motivations, beliefs and desires different from 
their own and, therefore, on those grounds, do not feel compelled to communicate.  
The Sally-Anne False Belief Test
160
 
The Sally-Anne False Belief test illustrates how a child with autism experiences the 
world.
161
 It highlights the nature of social responses for a person without Theory of Mind. 
The participant watches a series of scenes between two dolls, Sally and Anne. In front of 
Sally there is a basket and in front of Anne there is a box. Sally hides a marble in the 
basket. When Sally leaves the room Anne takes the marble out of the basket and hides it in 
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the box. Then Sally comes back into the room. At this point the participant is asked three 
questions:
162
 
1. Where will Sally look for the marble? (Belief Question) 
2. Where is the marble really? (Reality Question) 
3. Where was the marble in the beginning? (Memory Question) 
Experiments like this are looking for responses which provide specific information about 
the nature of the autistic brain. As such, the experimenters do not want to measure 
responses which stem from intellectual impairment (autism is often co-morbid with 
intellectual impairment). In order to do this comparisons are made between participants 
with autism, down syndrome and normally developed peers. Due to the nature of autism 
and, to a lesser extent, down syndrome, the participants are matched by their 
developmental age rather than their chronological age to ensure that the experiment is 
measuring comparative difference rather than developmental delays.
163
 Using participants 
with down syndrome as a comparative pool means that if the responses are shared over 
both groups then the response is probably not different limited to the specific disorder.
164
 
 Each of the three questions in the Sally-Anne False Belief Test is targeting a 
specific capacity in the participant. The questions are defined as questions of memory, 
reality and belief. Of those participants with autism, 80% incorrectly answered the belief 
question assuming that Sally had the same perception of the scene as they did and would, 
therefore, know that the marble was now hidden in the box. All of the participants in this 
particular study successfully answered both the memory question and the reality question. 
The Mirror Self-Recognition Test
165
 
Psychology uses an experiment centred on the tool of the mirror to offer examples 
of different combinations of self exhibiting behaviours. Ideally, by contrasting the Sally-
Anne False Belief Test and the Mirror Test in light of the self criteria, an account can be 
made for the 20% of people with autism which passed the Sally-Anne Test. The use of a 
mirror allows for an experimenter to introduce a second being into the room so that the 
interactions which ensue between the original individual and the individual’s reflection can 
be observed. This interaction can be expressed in a number of ways. If the individual 
recognises the reflection as his/her own then the case offers an account of self recognition 
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which requires the individual to be aware of his/her own self first. If the person does not 
recognise the reflection as his/her own but does recognise the reflection as a person, a case 
can be made for self-other recognition. Finally, if the individual does not recognise the 
reflection as a person, distinct from the other objects in the reflection, then a case can be 
made that the individual does not have awareness of his/her own self or of others.
166
 This 
type of experiment is important as it begins to illustrate the difference between awareness 
of one’s own self as distinct from the world versus awareness of other selves. 
The third criterion of the self as described in Chapter Five is the awareness of one’s 
self as distinct from the world. That is, individuals with a self can isolate themselves as 
separate from the surrounding objects of their environment. To distinguish one’s self as 
distinct from one’s surroundings is different from distinguishing other people from objects 
and then recognising that they are similar to one’s self. It could be argued that the ability of 
self-other recognition is more basic than the ability to distinguish self-object distinctions 
because the first ability requires an assumption of kind where the second is an assumption 
of difference. However, the assumption of kind, made in the self-other case is not simple in 
that it requires the two-fold distinction of identifying that others may be like you but also 
that not all other types of object have this similarity to one’s self. Therefore, it is a more 
complex progression than that of identifying oneself as distinct from other objects.  
In the Mirror Test participants have a sticker placed on their faces by their parents. 
If they use the reflection to motivate a response to the sticker then it can be said that they 
identify themselves in the reflection.
167
 Not all of the participants recognised the reflection 
as belonging to themselves. However, some had social responses to the reflection despite 
not knowing it was their own. These social responses allow the inference to be made that 
participants had picked out their reflection as a similar being to themselves and can thus be 
described as having a self-other capacity. Reddy et al. (2010) found that children with 
autism spent as much time examining the other objects reflected in the mirror as their own 
reflection. They also spent little to no time interacting in a social manner with the 
reflection of themselves. This was true of both those children with autism who recognised 
their reflection and of those who did not identify with the reflection.
168
 
The primary distinction which needs to be made here is that it is possible for 
individuals with autism to identify their reflection as their own without feeling the need to 
interact socially with it. Thus, unlike their typically developing and down syndrome peers, 
individuals with autism do not identify the aspect of other in their reflection. Individuals 
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with autism have been shown to consider themselves as distinct agents and in a different 
condition than those objects that can be acted upon.
169
This means that it is possible for an 
individual with autism to fail to have the standard of Theory of Mind but to have those 
faculties required for our third criterion of self-that of awareness of self as distinct from the 
world. 
Lack of Self Need Not Be Considered a Debilitation – The No-Self Thesis 
The No-Self concept is a complicated idea.  A person can have a ‘No Self’ concept 
when  he/she does not conceive of him/herself as an individual in a world with other 
people. Rather he/she perceives the world in a fashion where all else is grouped. Such a 
person is not part of ‘the others’ group’ but neither is he/she part of his/her own group. 
This is a lonely arrangement – it is very impersonal.170 However, it has sometimes been 
considered a positive thing.  The concept that there is not a self which resides somewhere 
between the plain of the phenomenal world and that of the mental world is very similar to 
the thesis of thought which Dennett offers.
171
 The difference between Dennett’s approach 
to the self and the No-Self Thesis is that Dennett’s choice of language is positive in the 
sense that its description of the self is creative; it seems to build something. The No-Self 
Thesis, on the other hand, is classically described in negative terms requiring a breakdown 
of the false impression of self. 
The concept of a No-Self type can be found in a variety of literature ranging from 
philosophy and psychology to religion. Psychology discusses it in relation to disorders 
such as schizophrenia and autism. The No-Self status describes the net result of the 
characteristic of impaired social communication shared by both disorders. Autism and 
schizophrenia affect an individual’s ability to place him/herself in reality. Reality, in this 
case, is used to refer to the external world. The external world contains other people and 
their respective selves.  
Individuals suffering from schizophrenia experience a loss of self because their 
perspective of reality when threatened by delusions becomes confused. Reality and a clear 
distinction of self is shaken by the individual’s attempts to account for the delusions.172 
Delusions such as those of non-existent people telling a sufferer what to do cause a fission 
                                                          
169
Hobson, R. P., (1990). On the Origins of Self and the Case of Autism. Development and Psychopathology. 
2.. DOI:10.1017/S0954579400000687. pp 163-181 
170
Giles, J., (April, 1993). The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity. Philosophy East and 
West. Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 175-200 
171
Dennett, D. C., (2005). Sweet Dreams. Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. The MIT 
Press. Cambridge 
172
Sass, L. A.; Whiting, J.; Parnas, J., (2000). Mind, Self and Psychopathology: Reflections on Philosophy, 
Theory and the Study of Mental Illness. Sage Publications, Vol. 10(1): pp 87–98 
72 
 
of sense for the person experiencing the delusion. The person must decide whether these 
experiences are part of his/herself or if they are part of the external reality. If he/she choose 
the external reality then the boundaries between the person’s self and their environment is 
breached with all of his/her internal experiences becoming part of the outside world reality 
and no longer part of him/herself. 
The nature of delusions is that they are like one’s internal world and, as such, it is 
very difficult to distinguish between a delusional thought and a legitimate thought. 
Consequently, the above decision for persons with schizophrenia is a problem because 
while they have banished the delusions into their external world they may also be pushing 
their legitimate thoughts into an external world as well. Thus, the person loses much of 
what healthy people consider to be reliable and definitive for their identities and 
personhood. If such persons choose to include their delusional thoughts into their sense of 
self they can become overwhelmed with incongruence’s and multiple beliefs about a topic 
thereby losing that sense of consistency which is so vital to a self. 
Let us now consider the person suffering from autism. Such persons are unlikely to 
ever develop a sense of self due to their almost complete inability to communicate socially 
which would have allowed them to place themselves within a social context. Instead 
persons suffering from autism cannot contextualise themselves consequently they are 
disconnected from the world.
173
 Autism and schizophrenia are examples where a state of 
No-Self is debilitating. Studies in religion and philosophy offer different views. 
Philosophy discusses the No-Self status as a ‘third option approach’. The third option 
approach is the idea that in any situation there are three basic ways of making a decision:  
a. To choose a different route, to make a change to the current process of events. 
b. To choose to maintain the status quo, to keep things as they have always been, to 
choose not to change. 
c. The third choice is to do nothing, to let the flow of events progress regardless of the 
outcome. It is the choice not to choose how things will progress. 
The third option or ‘c’ is like the No-Self status. It is the outcome where everything carries 
on and the potential actor stands outside the process. Being part of the process can only 
occur when the individual recognises both the process and themselves and the possible 
interaction between the two.
174
 Consequently, an individual who is not part of the process 
because  he/she does not perceive it, has No-Self. 
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Having No-Self is different from being without a self. A person with No-Self is as 
such because the self has been lost or has never developed. While persons with No-Self 
cannot develop one because they have no cognitive potential by which a self could arise, a 
state of No-Self does not lack an internal life. 
Buddhism explains that self language such as ‘I’ and ‘me’ are not words which 
represent real things rather they are words of convenience. Commentaries describe how 
Buddhism has two levels of speech: the conventional level which uses self language and 
the ultimate level which uses language such as ‘sense-bases’ and ‘elements’. 175  The 
religion describes how Buddhas or enlightened people speak two truths: one conventional 
and one ultimate. The distinction that Buddhism is drawing in its discussion of self is like 
that in philosophy. Firstly, while people may have an internal life which is expressed like 
that of a person with a self it does not follow that there is the necessity of having a self. 
Buddhism describes this state of No-Self as an enlightened one rather than a status 
resulting from debilitating disorders. Buddhists strive for this state; a state where the 
conventional language is seen for what it is and that what is true on the highest level is the 
experience of the sensations, not of what they could signify.
176
 
The Three Self Criteria Applied to an Individual with Autism 
Criterion One: Consciousness 
The first criterion of the self is that the individual is awake; that they have the 
capacity to receive information from the phenomenal world and to process it. The fact that 
individuals with autism interact with themselves and their environment can lead to the safe 
assumption that such an individual does indeed receive sensory data.  
Criterion Two: Reflective Consciousness 
Individuals with autism can be classed as having reflective consciousness because 
tests such as the Sally-Anne False Belief test note that the participants with autism manage 
to successfully answer the memory question (where was the marble in the beginning?) and 
the reality question (where is the marble really?). This ability indicates that the person with 
autism has the capacity to reflect on their perceptions and manipulate ideas of time lapse; 
that is, they can not only reflect on current perceptions but also on past perceptions. 
Criterion Three: Awareness of Self as distinct from the Physical World 
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The third criterion of the self is the idea that, among other things, for individuals to 
have a self, they must be aware that it is themselves who are conscious and reflecting on 
their consciousness, not that these experiences are of the universe. A different way of 
describing this is that the individuals must be aware that his/her thoughts and experiences, 
while triggered by the outside world, belong to him/her selves or his/her idios kosmos and 
that the experiences and thoughts while making up his/her own world are not the whole 
world. It is not necessary for an individual with a self to progress to the next step of Theory 
of Mind (Self-Other recognition) but often seen to be closely linked developmental 
progressions in typically developing individuals. 
The successful establishment of the third criterion is important for maintaining the 
balance between the idios kosmos and the phenomenal world. It was stated earlier that 
equilibrium between these two worlds is necessary for acceptance and integration into a 
social life. One of the keys to this integration is recognising at some level that others have 
a mental life as well. For persons with autism this is very difficult. In fact, it is one of the 
areas in their function which has been noted as fractured.
177
When people consider a young 
child they do not assume that it lacks a sense of self; rather, they recognise that the child 
will grow into a more highly cognitively capable individual. In fact, most parents and care 
givers do not even consciously consider this; rather, because of their own experiences and 
fulfilment of the third self criterion and then Theory of Mind they extend their assumption 
of self in others to include the young child. However, for an individual with autism this 
same extension is often not made. Where adults considering the toddler extend their beliefs 
of self on the grounds of the toddler having a potential for self, the individual with autism 
is assumed to have no potential and thus no self. This assumption occurs because Theory 
of Mind and the third self criterion appear to co-develop and are, therefore, not often 
perceived as distinct. To mistake a person with autism  as being without a self because of a 
lack of Theory of Mind is possibly denying them social inclusion.
178
 To refuse a person 
with autism social inclusion but to include a young child on the grounds of potential self 
appears to be an ethical breach. 
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Chapter Eight 
Disorders Elucidate the Self: Schizophrenia 
This chapter will focus primarily on the nature of schizophrenia and the manner in 
which the disorder can offer responses for the questions: what can schizophrenia teach us 
about the self; and, does an individual with schizophrenia have a self? 
The Disorder of Schizophrenia 
History of Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is a difficult disorder to explain in that it has a number of variants 
whereby the nature of its expression in any given individual can appear completely 
different to another individual with the same diagnosis. This, combined with a very limited 
knowledge of the underlying processes which contribute to the presence of the disorder, 
means that what is known of the disorder arises from a manifold collection of case studies 
and psychiatric accounts of people experiencing disorders which share a developmental 
similarity over their progression. Many cases share the common theme of a progressive 
and chronic course of cognitive and behavioural decline.
179
 The types of schizophrenia 
have been widely debated but what unifies the disorder is a psychological tone which 
makes them comparable.
180
  The term ‘schizophrenia’ was coined by Bleuler and was used 
to describe a group of disorders, of schizophrenias.
181
 It was also Bleuler who revised the 
idea that the disorder was distinguished by its course of degenerative decline and used 
symptoms to suggest a group of core deficits necessary to distinguish an individual as 
experiencing schizophrenia. At this point the distinction is first made about the positive 
and negative symptoms of the disorder.
182
 It is this idea of base symptoms which is 
currently used to isolate schizophrenia.   
The Diagnosis for Schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is divided into two conceptual parts. The first part is its 
characterisation, or expression in the world. There are two types of expression: that with 
positive symptoms and that with negative symptoms. Negative symptoms occur when 
usual personality traits are reduced; a negative symptom is the loss of normal attributes. 
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Negative characterisations include: affective flattening, alogia and avolition.
183
 Positive 
symptoms are those which are added to those traits already present in the individual’s 
personality. Positive symptoms include: hallucinations, delusions, disorganised speech, 
frequent derailment and incoherence and grossly disorganised or catatonic behaviour.
184
 
The second part of the schizophrenia diagnostic criteria is that the person experiences 
social/occupational dysfunction. These dysfunctions in the individual’s ability to maintain 
expected levels (for the specific individual) in areas such as work, interpersonal relations, 
self care and (in younger individuals) academic achievement.
185
 
Schizophrenia comes in episodes. To be diagnosed, the individual must experience 
the disturbance of their symptoms for at least six months with at least one of the months 
where positive symptoms are present. The episodic nature of the disorder results in periods 
where the individual’s presentation of self is disturbed. The disruptions can be so severe 
that the individual’s entire person seems to change. 186  Classical descriptions of this 
disorder do not use the concept of the self in their explanations; however, in an attempt to 
create a more unified account of the diverse nature of the disorder, there is a group of 
theorists looking at schizophrenia  through a consideration of consciousness and the self.
187
 
The term ‘schizophrenia’ has had many meanings over the course of history. It has 
been used as an example to argue the need for psychiatry and similarly, as an example of 
why psychiatry is not needed (as seen by low remedial success rates) by people who 
endorse the view that disorders are products of cultures not physiology.
188
 Schizophrenia 
can best be described in relation to this dissertation using clinical diagnostic descriptions 
and considering it as a disorder of perception. The perception that the individual presents 
to the world is abnormal in its nature. Those features which distinguish them as an 
individual are inconsistent with what is commonly expected; for instance, they have a 
flattened affect. The second way in which schizophrenia is a disorder of perception is that 
the individual experiencing the disorder has a disrupted flow of perception, whether by 
hallucinations and delusions or by not being able to distinguish the parameters between 
his/her body and the world.  
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Schizophrenia has an episodic nature in that the individual experiences episodes of 
the positive and negative symptoms and episodes which are apparently symptom less.
189
 
During periods where there is symptom presentation the hyperreflexivity is particularly 
severe and can result in the individual appearing to have distinct selves which are unrelated 
between the prodromal, risdual stages and the premorbid, schizophrenia stages.
190
  The 
next part of this chapter is divided into three parts: two examining perceptions of the self in 
someone with schizophrenia and the third proposing how the multiple selves’ doctrine may 
offer coherency to a person with schizophrenia. 
Two Perceptions of the Self with Schizophrenia 
The Expansive Approach or Ipseity Disturbance Account 
As has already been said, the disorder schizophrenia is a difficult subject because of 
the diversity of its expression. As such, having more than one collective account of the 
disorder should not be a surprise nor considered a weakness. Rather, it should be seen as an 
attempt to retain the breadth of the disorder. 
As noted, for an individual experiencing schizophrenia there is a blurring between 
those impressions which belong to the internal world and those of the phenomenal world. 
Sass et al. (2003) described schizophrenia as having two distinct and complimentary 
aspects: hyperreflexivity and a distinct diminishing of self affection.
191
 Hyperreflexivity is 
when the experience the individual has of his/her self extends to include other aspects of 
the phenomenal world. Self-affection is the capacity to identify one’s self as a distinct and 
unified subject of awareness. A diminishing of this capacity results in an incoherence of 
self identification.
192
 Hyperrefflectivity and self-affection are very similar distinctions to 
those made by the Self Criteria Two and Three. 
Criterion Three is the ability to identify one’s self as distinct from the world. 
Criterion Two is the faculty of reflective consciousness. This criterion is not as vital to 
hyperreflexivity and self-affection but is necessary for the expression of these ideas. That 
is, the reflective consciousness is at the root of considering objects beyond one’s self as 
part of one’s self. This transference can only occur if individuals feel they can reflect on 
the sensory data offered to them by this other object. The individual must feel that this 
object is a part of him/herself and therefore possible to reflect upon. The third criterion is 
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clearly an integral part of the discussion of schizophrenia because the ability to identify 
one’s self as being such is the primary disturbance of an individual with schizophrenia. 
This disturbance appears in two forms. Firstly, an individual experiences objects outside of 
his/her internal worlds as within his/her internal world. In essence, individuals with this 
disturbance have an overactive inclusivity principle where they include parts of the 
external world within their conception of their self. Objects no longer reside firmly within 
the phenomenal world.
193
 The result of this inclusion is that individuals experience 
difficulty in creating a unified concept of their self.
194
 When someone attempts to unify or 
define something, he/she categorises similar experiences together; when someone includes 
parts of the phenomenal world in his/her internal description of self, the kind of material 
they are attempting to integrate is very diverse. Consequently the account of self which 
he/she attempts to form will differ drastically from classical descriptions such as those 
which arise using the Narrativity Thesis.
195
  The different account of self which people 
with schizophrenia form results in the common misconception that they have multiple 
personalities. This is not the case. However, it does lead to the interesting option whereby 
an episodic description of self may be a more coherent method by which they can establish 
a unified self concept.  
The Exclusive Approach  
 This approach to the issue of the self for someone with schizophrenia is distinct in 
that it focuses on the nature of the two central relationships which break down for such a 
self. These are the relationship between the individual’s self and his/her body, and the 
relationship between the self and objects (with the body offering a medium of 
expression).
196
 The notion of the body and the self having a necessary relationship is one 
offered as a premise for the expression of self in the first part of this dissertation. The body 
is a form through which behaviours attributed to the self can be analysed. In Part One 
many reasons were offered for the requirement of the body in connection to the self. One 
of these was the idea of ’presence’. Authors such as Descartes offer the idea that the self 
resides within the body
197
 and this is known by a sense of presence. We feel with 
conviction that the ‘I’ is within or of the body. Someone with schizophrenia experiences a 
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loss of this sense of presence; there is a sense of being a spectator, a remote observer of the 
body rather than the sense of residence or attachment with the body.
198
 This problem is 
particularly difficult for someone with schizophrenia in that it creates a sense of isolation 
and helplessness. Due to the third person connection between the self and its respective 
body, the self experiences a detachment between its desires and motivations and the 
behaviours of the body. The body appears to behave independently of the self’s instruction. 
The second relationship which experiences problems is that of the relationship 
between the individuals and objects. Objects have their meaning for any given individual 
in the utility that they provide to that individual.
199
 Individuals who experience a division 
from their body are removed from the interface which facilitates interactions with objects. 
Objects offer utility to the individual only in the nature of the physical world. A physical 
object offers little or no utility to someone who cannot interact with that world. Therefore 
the relevance of objects and other individuals (residents of the physical world) is very low 
for someone experiencing schizophrenia as they have no means of benefiting or interacting 
with them. 
The combination of experiencing a division between the self/body and the 
body/objects results in a compounding effect of disconnect for an individual suffering from 
schizophrenia. The individual loses the perceived utility of objects within the phenomenal 
world, thus an appearance of apathy occurs. In the previous chapter it was discussed that 
an individual with autism appears to have no motivation to interact with other people, that 
he/she did not perceive the value of communication. Schizophrenia can have a similar 
effect in that the individual loses the realisation that the objects around him/her can have 
worth or value. This effect may arise from a disruption in sensory processing where 
previously stable physical properties of the phenomenal world change inexplicably.
200
 For 
instance, the individual’s limbs may appear to change size independently of the rest of the 
body. When someone experiences a division from their body due to a loss of perceived 
presence the body becomes like a character in a play where the individual with 
schizophrenia is not the director. This loss also contributes to why the individual then loses 
an appreciation of object utility. The object only has utility to the individual in the manner 
of the interaction it has with the body, so if the individual is not connected with the body 
then the object has virtually no value. In fact, the object only becomes interesting in that it 
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shares the world with the body which the individual can or does not feel connected to. The 
individual experiencing this type of separation from the phenomenal world is said to 
attempt to create a hypothesis of this experience, to provide an explanation which makes 
sense of a world which has changed so drastically.
201
 These hypotheses or accounts can be 
seen in the types of hallucinations and delusions which occur as positive symptoms for a 
sufferer of schizophrenia. At times this type of separation can result in individuals 
believing that their body is another self because the behaviours and perceived motivations 
of the body are so separate from what the individual feels he/she is experiencing.
202
 
Multiple Selves – An Algorithm for Sense 
The diversity of expressions of the disorder schizophrenia result in wide and 
varying accounts of how it is best treated and understood. What is apparent in all of this is 
that one of the most debilitating aspects of the disorder is the confusion that arises in trying 
to offer an account of the different experiences which occur for the individual suffering 
from it.  In both the Ipseity account and the Exclusive approach to describing the 
experiences of the self with schizophrenia, a sense that the individual experiences multiple 
selves is mentioned. The Multiple Selves Doctrine discussed in Chapter Three offers a 
description of the self which differs starkly from the Narrativity Thesis in that it allows for 
multiple selves within one individual without the idea being a debilitating or delusional 
thought.
203
 The idea that in each moment a self is distinct and that an infinite number of 
moments occur in any given lifetime means that multiple selves exist for each individual. 
These selves can be considered of one individual by their relative similarity to each 
other.
204
 This approach would mean that the individual with schizophrenia would only 
have to recognise a small percentage of his/her perceptions in order to unify his/her 
concept of self or collective self. So long as there is some psychological continuity and 
connectedness then a unified expression can be found for the individual with schizophrenia. 
The alternative, using the Narrativity approach to the self, would require the individual to 
absorb his/her perceptions and experiences, however strange, into a coherent and singular 
description of his/her self. Schizophrenia is an onset disorder in that rarely does someone 
experience the disorder during childhood. As such it is more than likely that the self 
perceptions have already become established. Consequently, the onset of schizophrenia can 
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be very frightening as the individual attempts to provide an account of his/her perceptions 
and experiences using his/her childhood method of self construction. It is possible that 
individuals suffering from schizophrenia may need to be taught different ways of 
perceiving the self so that the tool of self can become beneficial again. The self has been 
discussed as the tool which provides a reference point or method by which coherency can 
be found in the plethora of our perceptions.
205
 The individual with schizophrenia, like the 
child with autism, experiences an intensity of perceptions which are often overwhelming, 
resulting in some cases in a weakening of the self tool.  
Schizophrenia and the Self 
The remainder of the chapter will examine the question of whether someone with 
schizophrenia can be considered to have a self, by examining the disorder with respects to 
the three Self Criteria and the Self Premise. 
Schizophrenia and the Premise of the Self (the Body) 
In order for the self to be an informative concept and a productive aspect of what it 
is to be a person it must have expression within the world. The body is seen as the 
necessary aspect by which an expression of self can occur. Without the body the self has 
little relevance. A person with schizophrenia experiences disruptions in his/her perception 
of the body and the boundary where the internal and the external worlds meet through the 
body becomes ambiguous.
206
 While the boundaries between internal and external worlds 
are in no way clear and precise, common sense allows individuals to make the distinction 
between objects of the external phenomenal world versus the internal private world. It is 
the body which forms the perceived boundary between the two in that it offers a 
perceivable line. While this does not mean that the self is necessarily within the body, it 
does mean that the body offers a point of reference by which phenomenal input can be 
categorised.
207
 For someone with schizophrenia the sense of what is of the phenomenal 
world and what is of the internal world becomes dislodged. It is as if he/she loses the 
ability to make a common sense distinction and when dealing with the mass of phenomenal 
sensory input, he/she ascribes distinctions between the internal and external worlds without 
reflection of the bodily boundary.
208
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Schizophrenia results in the loss of tools to maintain a coherent approach to the 
distinction between the internal and external worlds.
209
 While individuals with 
schizophrenia may experience a loss of apparent connection or identification with their 
body, they do not appear to lose a sense of self. They still use the body as a way of 
referencing themselves; they just do not perceive a unified relationship between the body 
and the self; instead the body can become a member of the external world.
210
 Likewise the 
body can appear to contain multiple other selves, in that the individual perceives 
him/herself and other selves as resident within the same body. This is different to the idea 
of Multiple Personality disorder in that for someone with schizophrenia these other selves 
can reside in the external world as well as the internal world rather than being specifically 
contained by the body.
211 212
 It is the loss of a coherent method of distinguishing the 
internal from the external and thus the self from others which is distinct in the disorder of 
schizophrenia. So an individual experiencing schizophrenia may not prioritise his/her body 
as the interface for the self in the phenomenal world: the loss of this distinction is not 
sufficient for a loss of self; rather, it indicates the importance of understanding the criteria 
of the self. 
Criteria of the Self 
Criterion One: Consciousness 
The first criterion of the self is that the individual is experiencing or conscious. 
They must be capable of experiencing phenomenal input and retaining the information. 
This is clearly identified in someone with schizophrenia; in fact the disorder is better 
described an inundation of sensory input as opposed to an absence of input.  
Criterion Two: Reflective Consciousness 
Reflective consciousness refers to the capacity to examine phenomenal input and 
make an assessment of this material. This capacity is seen in the ability to form ideas 
which in turn is reflected in people’s behaviours. Delusions are a symptom of 
schizophrenia and are the product of an individual formulating explanations of experiences 
based on perceived phenomenal input. These reflections are considered delusional only 
when direct evidence to the contrary is not taken into consideration or is not given value by 
the individual. Symptoms such as delusions support the conclusion that an individual with 
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schizophrenia has a self. It is not, however, necessary that an individual with schizophrenia 
has delusions, so other evidence must be identified to support the idea that such individuals 
have a reflective consciousness. The episodic nature of schizophrenia allows for the 
observation of the individual while he/she is not experiencing a schizophrenic episode or 
schizophrenic symptoms. During these periods individuals can experience relatively 
normal functioning and as such their behaviours are very similar to those of a normal 
developmental and socially adjusted individual. As such their behaviours exhibit the ability 
to reflect on their consciousness. 
Criterion Three: Awareness of Self as distinct from the Physical World 
This is the final criterion of self and one which offers the most difficultly in the 
discussion of schizophrenia. Due to the nature of schizophrenia there is not a predictive 
pattern in how the individual will interpret their perceptions and as such many variants of 
expression of self occur. For some there appears to be a distinct presence of self in that the 
confusion lies not with the presence of his/her own self but with the presence of other 
selves and their relative influence on the world around them. The third criterion requires 
the ability for the individual to isolate his/her self as distinct in the world. An individual 
with schizophrenia can experience a variety of different expressions of the self in the 
phenomenal world. In some cases the self extends to include objects in the world as part of 
itself. In such cases the perception of the internal world expands to include parts of the 
phenomenal world and the individual believes that he/she experiences internal impressions 
from these objects.  Other cases describe an individual with schizophrenia where the self 
has totally withdrawn into an almost purely theoretical expression excluding all of its 
perceptions including those of the body into an objectifiable world where it lacks the 
power to influence change. Still others are where the individual with schizophrenia 
experiences other selves (such as through auditory hallucinations) in addition to his/her 
own self moving indiscriminately over the boundaries between the internal and external 
worlds.  
Typically an examination of behaviour and subjective accounts would provide a 
clear account of whether individuals can identify themselves as distinct from the world 
around them. Individuals with schizophrenia almost seem to have an over active capacity 
to identify themselves. Considering the case of schizophrenia is akin to watching the tides 
at a beach in that the boundaries between the self and the world are in constant flux. 
Sometimes they are very particular and narrow, whereby little of what is often included 
(such as the perceived relationship with the body) is absent; while at other times the self 
covers so much of the external world that it appears to expand in such a way that it is 
84 
 
almost unidentifiable. At no point does there appear to be a complete absence of an 
external world or of the self even if the state or nature of each of these aspects changes. 
Therefore it can be concluded that individuals with schizophrenia can distinguish 
themselves as distinct from the external world. However, as the two worlds are in constant 
flux it can be very difficult to distinguish and rely on the self as a tool for coherency in 
perception and interpretation.  
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Chapter Nine 
The Function of the Self 
The objective of this final main chapter is to consider the functional benefits of the 
self for the system that constitutes an individual. In Part One of this dissertation, the 
discussion has generally centred on an isolated individual and how the identification of self 
in that individual can be achieved. As the discussion has widened in Part Two to include 
those with psychological disorders, the effect another’s perceptions can have on the 
development of the self has become apparent.  
The nature of the self can be better understood through an examination of its 
expression within others’ perceptions and within its environment. Its role can be fleshed 
out by the nature of those perceptions and beliefs about the individual. As individuals may 
not always perceive others within their environment, an examination of how the individual 
relates to his/her environment will also expand our understanding of the nature of the self. 
This chapter examines both the expression of the self in the relationship between an 
individual and others, as well as an individual and his/her environment. 
While earlier chapters have established the theoretical nature of the self, discussion 
has persisted as to the measurable influences on the self, despite measurability usually 
being restricted to physical form. This section will look at the culmination of those 
influences on the expression of an individual and the measurability of this effect. This 
examination will focus significantly on others’ perceptions of the individual. In discussing 
the self with particular reference to others’ perceptions of it, there is the tendency to 
discuss the self with respect to its worth. However, this leads into the realm of self-worth 
literature.
213
 Such material focuses on gaining back ownership of esteem and worth 
evaluations through evolving a relationship with ourselves in an ‘other’ capacity. The 
process occurs through an internal assessment of the individual’s values and beliefs. One 
of the primary aspects to this process is learning to devalue the idea that others dictate the 
respective value of an individual.
214
 This chapter is not about examining self-worth. In 
self-worth or esteem literature there is a focus on the content of the statements about 
individuals: whether they are produced by the individual or others. In contrast, this chapter 
will look at the fact the statements were made in the first place. The ability to make 
statements about one’s own or another’s self is the evidence required to validate the 
function of that self. Acknowledgement of an individual establishes their existence to a 
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perceiver, and the ability to respond to this individual as distinct from oneself is one of the 
specific capabilities which a self offers to an individual. 
The Self – a Cause or an Effect?  
The theories which we have considered up to this point have not established 
whether a self evolves before social interaction or after; however, it is recognised that it 
goes through a process of development.
215
 Humans, as a species, require social interaction 
in order to survive. Without at least one other human to provide care, a human infant 
cannot survive. It would be reasonable to conclude that while the self may not be innate, it 
does develop in the presence of social interactions. If it emerges after social interactions 
begin then it can be stated that there is a correlation between the two phenomena of 
socialisation and self, but a conclusion cannot necessarily be made as to whether the 
socialisation is a cause of the self. 
The question of cause and effect refers to the idea of whether the self develops 
before the individual can participate with intention and deliberation in social interactions, 
or after. Are the interactions an exchange of significant symbols (as opposed to an 
interaction of conversational gestures) or situations where one participant offers significant 
symbols while the other only conversational gestures?
216
 Proficiency in social interactions 
requires a self. Social interactions are proficient if they are effective in producing the 
desired outcomes of the individuals involved. Criterion Two states that the ability to reflect 
on our behaviours is an aspect of self. This capacity can inform us of future patterns of 
behaviour thereby allowing us to evolve the ability of prediction. Being able to predict 
patterns of behaviour in our own self can assist with decision making according to the type 
of outcome desired. If the self is coupled with Theory of Mind then this predictive capacity 
becomes even more useful, for it means that the behaviours of others can be anticipated 
allowing responses to be prepared in advance for possible outcomes.  The self offers the 
individual the tools required to interpret behaviour patterns and respond in an informed 
manner. This type of skill is valuable when it comes to surviving one’s environment. This 
was equally true of early humans as it is for humans today.  
Others 
Previously there was a discussion on the distinction between the self and the 
Theory of Mind. The self is, in brief terms, the establishment of the individual; specifically, 
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an identification of the individual’s perceptions; a method of interpretation for those 
perceptions and an understanding of the independent existence of the individual. Theory of 
Mind is the transference of this state to other like individuals. When the idea of self is 
examined an assessment of its function or influence in its expression to the world must be 
considered. This expression can be best assessed through the relationships between the 
individual in question and others. The ability to identify others as individuals is not a 
faculty required in this dissertation’s conditions of self. Rather it is a faculty (Theory of 
Mind) which develops in concert with or soon after the cognitive ability to perceive one’s 
self as distinct from the surrounding world. These two cognitive abilities make a 
distinction similar to that made by George H. Mead between the state of the social self and 
the self which responds to the social self - a reflection of self.
217
 The previous chapters on 
autism and schizophrenia illustrate why it is not wise to assume that because an individual 
develops one faculty another similar faculty will also develop. It does demonstrate why 
each apparently simple faculty is necessary to integrate comfortably within community. 
Different behaviours are not treated with equity when it comes to social interactions. This 
can be seen in historical cases of discrimination.  
In Relationship 
The concept of relationship becomes important because it is in relationships that 
individuals make judgements on their perceptions. The individual in question has a self, 
and as he/she assesses the world he/she can perceive it in at least two ways. Firstly, the 
perceiving individual may not have evolved a Theory of Mind and consequently may not 
interpret other individuals as having selves. This does not mean that he/she only 
experiences one self; it is possible that he/she may experience multiple selves personal to 
his/her internal world.
218
The second form of perception which the individual may have is 
that if he/she has developed a Theory of Mind then he/she can perceive the self in others. 
When individuals make a judgement on their environment, to distinguish its members into 
categories (specifically whether the items considered are other selves or objects), they do 
so within a relationship to their environment. In Chapter Eight the idea of an object’s worth 
was described through its utility to the individual. Likewise, whether an individual 
distinguishes other selves or not, the parts of its environment are judged on their perceived 
utility. Other selves offer utility in a multitude of ways: they can offer opportunities for 
communion, knowledge, resources and protection, to name a few. If other selves are not 
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identified it does not mean the other individuals lose their utility. Rather their utility is not 
as wide ranging or beneficial because the other individuals become less predictable or 
controllable. Having a self and being able to observe other selves is valuable because it 
opens up the potential for communication and mutually beneficial relationships. 
When considering the question of what we perceive in other people, a series of 
observations can be made. Firstly, the physical aspects of an individual can vary and are an 
unreliable measure of what it is to be that person. There is an argument in which a pile of 
sand is named and a discussion had by two individuals which, in this case, will be called 
the teacher and the pupil. The teacher asks the pupil whether the pile of sand is, in fact, a 
pile of sand. The pupil answers that the sand is, indeed, a pile. The teacher proceeds to 
remove a grain of sand from the pile and repeats the question to the pupil. The pupil’s 
answer is the same. The teacher continues to remove sand a grain at a time each time 
asking the pupil if there is still a pile of sand. The pupil continues to answer in the 
affirmative. Eventually the teacher will remove all the sand and the pupil will answer that 
there is no longer a pile of sand, but at what point does the sand cease to be a pile? While 
parts can be removed, the pile is not, in fact, the sand but a concept of what a pile is like. 
The concept of the pile of sand can be likened to the physical body. The body is not the 
person; rather it is the physical image of what the person is like. The body is like an object; 
its worth is found only in its utility. The self which resides with the body is what is 
identified when we perceive other individuals (in most cases). The self elevates the body 
from being an object to being the physical representation of a person. This self is identified 
or recognised by another self through the identification of similarities, a shared nature. The 
self is the aspect which resonates within the beholder. The Self Criteria and the Theory of 
Mind imply that while all other aspects of an individual may change what is particular to 
identifying others as similar to one’s self is the identification of their selves. For this reason 
the self is valuable as it identifies us; it allows us a reference point for relationship. 
Other individuals are important to the discussion of self regardless of whether the 
self in question can identify them because an item’s value is measured by its benefits to the 
individual and to others. If the self acts as a necessary predicating faculty for identifying 
other selves, then it is important in that it allows an individual the tools necessary for 
communicating with those others which, in turn, allows for the development of 
relationships and finally, the formation of cooperative groups. These cooperative groups or 
communities function as necessary features for human survival. There are two ways in 
which the identification of self in others can be described. It can be the process of the 
individual recognising aspects of his/her own self in the other or it can be the experience of 
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identifying another individual self by its shared traits with his/her own in their behaviour 
and expression.  The distinction between the two is that in the first scenario what is 
recognised is the uniqueness of the beholder’s self while in the other what is recognised is 
the similarity between two selves. We value the idea of other selves because being in 
relationships affirms the existence of our own self and, likewise, the other selves are also 
affirmed.  
The Self’s Role in Communication 
The interaction between selves (by way of communication) will become integral to 
understanding the value of self as a tool. Communication forms the basis for the social 
process. Mead offers a tripartite description of the nature of communication. The first 
aspect of the process is an initiating gesture by the individual (aspect one) followed by a 
response to that gesture (aspect two) offered from the other; that gesture must be a result of 
the initial gesture (the third aspect) of the tripartite. When a conversation of gestures gains 
intentionality it progresses from a general action to a significant symbol. Language marks a 
transition from basic gestures to significant symbols. Language can be formed in a variety 
of different ways, not always verbal. Sometimes language is mostly gestures as in the case 
of sign language for the deaf. What makes the actions, verbal or otherwise, into language is 
that they become significant symbols carrying meaning. Once meanings are attached to the 
actions, an individual can respond to the meanings in actions offered by other individuals. 
Thus the tripartite process of communication begins. For Mead this process of developing 
significant symbols and meanings happens through social exposure. It is possible that 
during this process the individuals could develop significant symbols with meaning 
unrelated to those meanings commonly ascribed by their social group. Therefore an 
individual may not appear to communicate or seem to have extremely limited 
communications as a result of a different set of transcribed meanings.  For instance, in 
Chapter Seven, in the discussion of the idios kosmos, four functions of the internal world 
of an individual were described. One of these functions was an Ethical Option which 
describes how people with autism move away from common sense perceptions and 
interpretations of the world resulting in behavioural peculiarities.
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Mead supports an emergent self; that is, he anticipates that the self is a product of 
social interaction. The self, according to Mead, organises our perceptions. The unique 
nature of the self is its reflective process; it perceives itself as an object. Other objects such 
as the body do not perceive themselves as objects in that they cannot reflect on their full 
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selves rather just aspects of themselves. The reflective process or consciousness occurs 
when individuals enter their consciousness as an object. There they consider themselves as 
an other within their internal perceptions. This process is akin to projecting the idea of 
oneself into the perception so that it becomes a subject to be examined like an object. In 
order to achieve this third person-like perception an individual must use his/her 
experiences of the social environment containing other individuals as a model of how to 
perceive his/her own self.
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For Mead, the self evolves social presence before it can 
identify its self. It does so by having a social expression and then reflecting on this 
expression thus identifying its self. A self offers improved social engagement and control. 
When it can perceive itself it begins to develop a comprehensive understanding of how 
others may think. The third person perception of self coupled with social experiences of 
other individuals assists an individual toward becoming skilled in the behaviours of others; 
a valuable ability for a social species such as humans whose ability to survive is increased 
with the formation of community groups.  
Society’s View on the Self 
During an individual’s development, specifically in his/her younger years, he/she is 
surrounded by societal interactions - some directed at him/her and others just within his/her 
environment. In early childhood while the self has yet to fully develop, the individual is 
afforded the lenience that the promise or potential to have a self gives. This promise is 
sufficient to be treated as if one has a self already. For instance, there are expectations 
regarding the standards of treatment and care of that individual that presuppose an ethical 
problem. The infant may be present in a society or community but his/her inclusion is 
dependent on his/her developing a self. During the pre-self years the child is accepted in 
the society through personification and the understood pattern of self development seen in 
others’ behaviours. However, should the development process be abnormal or, after a 
period of time, the individual’s behaviour starts to deviate from recognised patterns, then 
there is a problem. The self is valuable because it facilitates the ability to reflect on our 
own actions which allows us to establish patterns of behaviour which, in turn, help us to 
anticipate behaviours and outcomes. An individual whose development, as seen by his/her 
behaviours, is abnormal ceases to be predictable to his/her peers. This can result in the 
peers failing to identify any similar aspects to themselves in the individual which, in turn, 
is expressed in their belief that the individual does not share the same type of self. If the 
self is that which is recognised by the beholder as the identifying feature required for 
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inclusion in the beholder’s community, then a self that is unrecognisable will experience 
exclusion.  The beginning of this dissertation discussed the idea that definitions are 
established by grouping categories with the same or similar features. It was established that 
a different method would need to be used when attempting to define what made each 
individual particular because similarities are not what makes an individual unique. 
Consequently, it was decided that what made people different would be examined. This 
idea can be applied to the case of the individual with the unrecognisable self. It is not the 
form of expression of the self that is important but rather the faculties which underlie the 
expression. An understanding of these faculties is needed if people are going to relearn 
how to identify other selves. The automated response, a product of the tendency to 
personify, to identify an individual by his/her similarities to one’s self is to limit others’ 
selves and possibly exclude them unfairly. 
The Value of the Self 
In considering the self, two additional aspects have been identified that magnify its 
value. While the self is of significance to the individual alone it is made more valuable 
with the presence of other selves, especially other selves which can be identified by the 
individual self. This is heightened again when the self is combined with a Theory of Mind 
(a simple concept once the self has already been established) for then there is a distinct 
increase in the capabilities of the individual. These capabilities form valuable assets 
contributing to successful communities.  
The self is a complex idea and in many ways it acts like a foundation for more 
advanced human activities such as relationships and communities. It can therefore be 
considered the nexus of a person. Many other functions stem from its base principles; one 
of the most valuable being a Theory of Mind. An individual with a self has the essence of 
what it is to be a person even if his/her functions cease to evolve after the self’s 
development.  The self is the foundation of our expression in the world. 
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What is the I that I am?  
An Enquiry into the Self: Thoughts Based on the Individual and the Perceptions of 
the Other  
A final examination must be given to the conclusions reached within this 
dissertation. I shall review the criteria necessary for the self together with the symbiotic 
necessity for the self’s expression established in Part One. A summary of the expression of 
the self within the perceptions of others follows – specifically, how the self is expressed 
within cases offered to us by psychology.  
Insight through the Individual 
Three criteria of self have been established and one symbiotic necessity for the 
expression of self.  
Expression of Self:  
As the examination of the self progressed through this dissertation one fact 
remained constant: that the self never appeared without the body. While the exact nature of 
the relationship between the body and the self was not established, it can be stated with 
certainty that the self’s relationship with the body is necessary for its expression. It is in the 
behaviour of the body that the self is identified, thus the body and the self are 
fundamentally linked.  
The Criteria of the Self 
Three necessary and sufficient criteria for the self were established: 
1. The being is conscious (awake and experiencing). 
In order for an individual to satisfy the first criterion of the self he/she must have 
the basic condition of consciousness. He/she must be capable of receiving perceptual input 
from the physical world and responding to this input. This requirement is of basic physical 
feedback and does not require any semblance of reasoning; rather it is a case of there being 
evidence of reactions to external stimuli.  
2. A reflective consciousness; the consciousness which can be reflected upon. 
The second necessary requirement of self is that the individual in addition to being 
conscious has a reflective consciousness. Reflective consciousness occurs when the 
individual examines the contents of his/her perceptions and chooses informed responses to 
them. This state differs from basic consciousness in that the reactions often illustrate 
evidence of reasoning and learning; that is, the reflective consciousness can allow the 
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individual to respond in an informed manner to a totally novel experience using tools 
gained from previous similar experiences. The criterion of reflective consciousness allows 
for the internal examination of the content of perceptions and therefore of the potential to 
learn and evolve a collection of interpretations of one’s perceptions. Reflective 
consciousness is the nature of an individual’s ideas and thoughts.  
3. Awareness; the being is aware that it is him/herself that contains the first 
two consciousnesses and not just that the universe is as such. 
The final necessary criterion of the self is the ability of the individual to distinguish 
him/herself as separate from the world; that is, that the individual’s internal contemplations 
of the world are specific to him/herself and not just of the world. In order for this to occur 
the individual must realise that his/her conscious and reflective consciousness is of 
him/herself and that the other items within the world are not of the same contemplations 
but may have contemplations or natures of their own. That is, that the external world has 
its existence independent of the individual and, therefore, the individual, rather than being 
the orchestrator of the world, is, in fact, a member of the world. Thus a personal concept of 
the individual’s self must evolve. The individual must isolate his/herself as distinct from 
the environment and, therefore, come to believe that there is something that it is to be like 
him/her. The individual must identify his/her distinct quiddity. 
Insight through the Other 
Function  
The self offers the function of providing meaning in the orientation of the 
individual within the world. A self who holds onto its distinctiveness from the world can 
make the move to intentional expressions within the world thus opening up opportunities 
for language and eventually community. 
Autism 
 An examination of the disorder autism provided a study of the process of 
identifying the self criteria within an individual’s expression in the world. In so doing it 
highlighted the difference between the self criteria and the Theory of Mind thesis. In this 
example a case was made for the presence of all three self criteria in the person but an 
absence of the Theory of Mind. It was seen that this absence of what appears to be a simple 
faculty can have far reaching effects as society often assumes that the person’s capacity for 
self is absent as well. 
Schizophrenia 
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The case of schizophrenia exemplifies the clouding effect which people’s 
behaviour has on the perception of others regarding an individual’s relative selfhood. 
While it was identified that an individual with schizophrenia has a self, its expression can 
be so diverse that it is commonly unrecognised. Traditionally, society or others identify a 
self in an individual through a progression of assumptions. Firstly, there is a 
personification and then a person isolates similar traits between him/herself and the 
individual thus imputing selfhood to the beheld individual. This method does not work in 
the case of an individual with schizophrenia as the episodic nature of the disorder distorts 
the traits of the individual. Consequently it impresses the value of a different approach to 
the imputation of self to another; that is, to identify the self on the grounds of its cognitive 
functions necessary for the criteria, not on the content of those criteria’s expressions. 
The Final Overture 
This dissertation’s position is that an individual may have a self if and only if they 
have a body giving the self a means of expression within the world. Further, I have argued 
that the individual must have these three faculties: consciousness, reflective consciousness 
and awareness. Each of these four aspects is necessary for the existence of a self within an 
individual. In order for each of these criteria to be identified informed examination must 
occur of an individual whereby his/her behaviour is perceived without the prejudice of 
societal expectation and convention. Anticipation and expectation of certain behaviours 
can lead to detrimental clouding of the truth of a situation. To not allow an individual the 
opportunity of self is to deny them the chance of community. The behaviours of 
individuals must be elucidated to locate the nature of each of their expressions so that a 
position can be established regarding the individual’s relative selfhood. A self gives an 
individual the capacity to navigate and excel in his/her presence in the world both with 
others and with him/herself. 
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